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ARTICLES
GENDER WARS: SELFLESS WOMEN
IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE
JOAN WILLIAMS*
A central theme in American thought is that society is a "republic of choice" comprised
of autonomous individuals with rights, making choices in pursuit of their own self-
interest. This ideology is covertly gendered. Professor Williams examines the abortion
and "working mother" debates and shows how, in both contexts, mothers who pursue
their own self-interest often are condemned as selfish. The reigning ideology, she con-
cludes, is best described as recommending selflessness for mothers and self-interest for
others. She applies this analysis to the rhetoric of choice in the abortion and the "work-
ing mothers" debates. Pro-choice advocates have defended abortion as the right of
women to choose their own destinies Professor Williams argues that this rhetoric taps
Americans' anti-government feelings in a powerful way, but also awakens gender fears
of selfish mothers and unnurtured children. These fears should be addressed by com-
bining choice rhetoric with reassuring messages that pro-choice advocates share with
their opponents a reverence for motherhood She argues that the abortion controversy
is not the place to challenge the norm of selflessness for mothers, but that the "'working
mothers" debate is. Whereas in the abortion context women's claims for choice and
autonomy pit them against the sanctity of life itself, in the 'working mothers" debate
women's rights can be framed as a matter of equality with men and fairness to chil-
dren. To accomplish this requires a challenge to the rhetoric of choice, which deflects
attention away from the constraints within which women's choices occur. In the con-
text of work/family conflict, choice rhetoric is an integral part of a gender system that
leaves women with different-and less desirable-choices than men. Feminists need to
challenge both the rhetoric and the institutions that make child nurture dependant on
the selflessness of mothers
* Visiting Professor, University of Virginia Law School; Professor of Law, Washington
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terms of 1991 and 1992, who challenged and supported me in fruitful combination; and to my
reading group in Washington, D.C., whose companionship over an eight-year period has influ-
enced me immeasurably. For generously sharing her time to help guide my formulation of the
issues, thanks to Ann Shalleck; for thoughtful readings and comments on prior drafts, I am
grateful to Kathryn Abrams, Mary Anne Case, Nancy Dowd, James X. Dempsey, Alan Free-
man, Angela Harris, Elizabeth Mensch, Constance Perin, Milton C. Regan, Jr., and to the
Feminist Theory reading group at University of Virginia Law School. Thanks for research
assistance to Catherine Stavrakis, Lisa Chase, Mary Kathryn Kelley, Carolyn Ikari, Arzoo
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1559
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
HeinOnline -- 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1559 1991
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Could I raise a kid alone? I have never wanted to raise a child
alone, because as a child with one parent I was so economically
and emotionally vulnerable that I couldn't do that to a child.
My mom had raised three after my father left, while working at
secretarial jobs. She drank herself to death and the three of us
feel lucky that we are not more screwed up than we are. I ra-
tionally know the difference between my mother and myself.
But could I do it?
Could I make it if I tried to raise a kid alone? I couldn't
afford much in the way of help, how would I do it? Would I
have a difficult pregnancy? I had already been sick as a dog for
two weeks-would it continue? [There was] no parental leave,
no maternity leave: plus the first woman to come up for [pro-
motion] couldn't ask for it if it had existed. If I refused to abort
and called his bluff and he decided to stay with me (which, I see
in retrospect would have been more likely to occur), then what?
I worked the second shift in our house and had accepted that
role-it seemed a fair trade at the time for the security of mar-
riage and, although I resented it somewhat I reminded myself
that he was from a traditional family and he might change later
and, after all, since we had no children, the burden was some-
thing I could live with. In other words, all the child-rearing
responsibilities would have been mine.
Finally, although I wasn't labelling it correctly then, the
abuse had started-in my heart of hearts I knew he would do to
his children what he had so often reported his dad had done to
him. I didn't want him to raise a child.
[So I aborted]. My friend Linda, who had had an abortion,
went with me. It was horrible.
Instead of focusing on what a bad, selfish person I was, as I
have, I can see how the real villain is a system that gave no
support or aid to my mother and that would not have supported
me. If at that time I had believed that I could continue to work
at a job that meant so much to my dignity and have a child, I
would have happily done it.1
INTRODUCTION
Abortion and work/family conflict are related in ways not often rec-
ognized. In practice, the economic marginalization of caregivers plays a
I Where not footnoted to a specific source, narratives such as this were told to me person-
ally. I have changed identifying details.
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contributing role in many abortions. 2 More abstractly, the phenomena
also are linked by the rhetoric of choice: abortion is defended on "pro-
choice" grounds; mothers "choose" to scale back work commitments be-
cause of their children's needs.
The rhetoric of choice stems from liberal imagery of autonomous
individuals making choices in their own self-interest. This imagery, pur-
portedly gender-neutral, in fact is covertly gendered. While this imagery
endorses self-interest as the proper motivation for all adults, the ideology
of conventional femininity condemns mothers who pursue self-interest
over their children's needs as "selfish." A more accurate understanding
of liberalism would recognize the way it excludes mothers from the re-
public of self-interested choice, mandating selflessness for mothers and
self-interest for others.
The rhetoric of choice often translates the power differential be-
tween men and women into conflicts within individual women and
among groups of women. Only by understanding how to control this
gender dynamic can feminists translate conflicts among and within
women back into conflicts over the power differential between men and
women. Underlying this approach is a postmodern sense that our rheto-
rics are social constructions that frame our range of possibilities. 3 If we
as feminists want to reconstruct the framework of women's lives, close
attention to rhetoric is vital to empower women-and men-to
reimagine a differently gendered world.
This Article argues that feminists need to become more self-con-
scious about the gender eddies that swirl around the rhetoric of choice.
The rhetoric is appropriate only where one's rhetorical goal is to focus
attention on the act of "free" choice. But, of course, choice always oc-
curs within constraints. Where one's goal is not to defend a realm of
freedom currently enjoyed, but to challenge the constraints limiting that
"freedom," the rhetoric of choice helps reinforce the gender structures
feminists need to challenge.
Part I explores the way choice rhetoric deflects a challenge to the
disempowerment of mothers into an internal gender war within individ-
2 Half of the aborting women surveyed in one study identified concern about how a child
would interfere with their job, employment or career as a key factor in their decision to abort,
and about two-thirds said they could not afford a child. See Aida Torres & Jacqueline D.
Forrest, Why Do Women Have Abortions?, 20 Fam. Plan. Persp. 169, 171-72 (Table 2) (1988)
(showing percentages of women having abortions for particular reasons). The study allowed
women to list more than one reason, and most women did. The average was almost four. Id.
at 171.
3 For a fuller discussion, see Joan Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate:
A Post-Modem Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 Duke
L.J. 296 (attempting to move beyond parallel debates over sameness and difference that have
split feminists and African-Americans by exploring "mirror-image" controversies).
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ual women. It also examines the linkage between the political ideology of
liberalism and the ideology of conventional femininity. Part II argues
that in the abortion context feminists have used the rhetoric of choice
with little understanding of the ways it awakens gender fears about self-
ish mothers destroying babies to pursue their own self-interest. While
choice rhetoric should not be abandoned in the abortion context since it
helps protect abortion rights, these gender fears need to be addressed.
Part III argues that feminists should challenge the rhetoric of choice
in the context of the debate over "working mothers."' 4 When women
speak of their "choice" to scale back work commitments in deference to
their children's needs, they help recreate and legitimize the system of
marginalizing caregivers by enshrining as ideal workers adults without
primary responsibility for children. The system blocks mothers from the
traditional avenues of power and responsibility and is a key element of
women's disempowerment both inside and outside the household.
Legislatures, not courts, soon will be the focus of efforts to ensure
meaningful access to abortion services for women.5 Moreover, resolving
the work/family conflict entails sweeping social and economic reforms
that will require profound social change. Consequently, this Article de-
parts from the conventional focus on analysis of legal doctrine. It starts
instead from the model of lawyer as persuader in the realm of social dis-
course and focuses on how to reframe existing rhetorics to achieve femi-
nist goals. The first step in that process is to build coalitions among a
broad range of women.
I
DOMESTICITY AS THE DANGEROUS SUPPLEMENT
OF LIBERALISM
A. The Republic of Choice
The rhetoric of choice long has played a central role in liberal
thought. In his recent study, The Republic of Choice, Lawrence Fried-
man argues that the "enthronement of the individual choice" dominates
modem legal culture.6 He maintains that "the scope of individualism
4 I place "working mother" in quotes to highlight the problems with the term. It implies,
first, that a woman who cooks, cleans and cares for a family is not working; in fact, of course,
if she has no help (and often even if she has) she is working hard. Thus, the term itself contrib-
utes to the devaluation and invisibility of women's work. The term also signals that ordinary
mothers are not employed; only working mothers are. We do not, of course speak of "working
fathers" because we assume fathers are employed.
5 See Linda Greenhouse, Both Sides in Abortion Argument Look Past Court to Political
Battle, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1992, at Al, B 11.
6 Lawrence M. Friedman, The Republic of Choice 27 (1990).
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was more limited in the nineteenth century" than it is today.7 Friedman
convincingly argues that when we use the same liberal language of auton-
omy and freedom prevalent in the nineteenth century, we mean some-
thing different by it. The celebration of freedom in the nineteenth
century referred primarily to economic freedom; private life continued to
be constrained by traditional norms of sexual, religious, and other forms
of personal propriety. 8 In contrast, freedom in the twentieth century in-
volves not property but personal choices and style of life.9 Notes Fried-
man, "Popular culture and opinion surveys suggest that people feel they
should be able to select, out of a rich menu of possibilities, whatever
patterns of living and behaving seem to suit them." 10 According to this
modem understanding, "each person has the right to the free develop-
ment or unfolding of... personality." 1
Friedman's study accurately describes both the shifts in, and the
centrality of, choice rhetoric in mainstream legal discourse. His book
aptly reflects contemporary liberalism's official story, 12 characterizing the
twentieth-century strain of individualism as an increase in freedom.13
Writing in the tradition of Whig history, 14 Friedman depicts our legal
history as a procession from dark to light, from a less to a more perfect
realization of our sacred Anglo-Saxon freedoms.15
Yet some of his examples may give us pause. Take the story that
opens Friedman's book-of a homeless person who lived in a "coffinlike
cardboard box" 16 in sub-zero temperature in New York City. This man
resisted a city order to come to a shelter, protesting, "They can't take me,
unless I do something wrong." "We've got rights," another homeless
man asserted.17 Friedman uses their stories to explain the "republic of
choice" he celebrates as an increase in human freedom.' 8 Don't they
7 Id.
8 See id. at 27-35.
9 See id. at 35-38.
10 Id. at 37.
11 Id. at 35 (quoting "fundamental" law of German Federal Republic, before reunification
of Germany).
12 For a different analysis of liberalism's "official story," see Robin West, Jurisprudence
and Gender, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 12-13 (1988).
13 See L. Friedman, supra note 6, at 47; see also id. at 37 (noting that zone of "choice,"
already great in past, seems to have expanded even more in 20th century); id. at 87 (calling our
times "golden age of... individualism").
14 For a different perspective, see Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart 32-35 (1985)
[hereinafter Habits] (critique of 19th century utilitarian individualism and 20th century "ex-
pressive" individualism).
15 See L. Friedman, supra note 6, at 37-38, 87.
16 Id. at 1 (quoting Josh Barbanel, On the Streets, Tough Test for New Homeless Policy,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1985, at BI).
17 Id.
Is Id. at 18-50.
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evidence instead an ideology that quite literally encourages the poor to
celebrate their right to sleep under bridges? The rhetoric of choice fo-
cuses on defending the right of the homeless to choose between life on the
streets and shelters that often are inhumane, filthy, and unsafe. This for-
mulation deflects our gaze from the inhumanity of a society as rich as
ours that offers only these two choices.
Here-as elsewhere-the rhetoric of choice diverts attention from
the constraints within which an individual's choice occurs onto the act of
choice itself. 19 Feminists ignore this dynamic at their peril. 20 Feminists
also must learn to assess and control the gender dynamic that arises
when their demands for liberation use the standard legal language of au-
tonomous individuals with rights making choices in their own self-inter-
est. The next section argues that such rhetoric awakens gender fears of
selfish women and unnurtured children.
B. Women's Exclusion from Self-Interest Ideology
Historian Ruth Bloch has documented the complex processes be-
hind the covert gendering of self-interest ideology. An understanding of
these processes must begin with a history of the concept of "virtue,"
which has had a complex relationship to "self-interest" in evolving polit-
ical ideology. 21 Bloch begins by detailing the process by which virtue
19 Friedman shows little awareness of this central dynamic within the rhetoric of choice.
At times he notices the way choice averts our gaze from the extent to which individuals are
actually free to choose: the "culture of individualism does not depend on whether people are
actually free to choose or as free as they think they are or would like to be. It is enough that
they believe they are." L. Friedman, supra note 6, at 60. Yet Friedman fails to follow through
the implications of this insight. Although he conscientiously notes that "powerful voices"
have challenged the ideology of choice, id. at 46-47, he is quick to discount these voices,
explaining that ideas of individualism and choice "do not enter people's head by magic. They
reflect common-sense judgments; they seem plausible to people; they rest on aspects of reality
of the modem world." Id. at 61; see also id. at 47 (stating that modem popular ideal exalts
person who creates way of living for himself by making choices that are open to individuals).
The fact that choice analysis is "common sense" reflects less its validity or "reality" than its
central role in structuring our form of life. Liberalism's grip on American political discourse
in general, and on legal discourse in particular, has led American women to frame the issues of
abortion and work/family conflict in terms of choice.
20 For other contemporary feminist critiques of choice, see Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and
Women's Choices, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 761 (1990); Lucinda M. Finley, Choice and Freedom: Elu-
sive Issues in the Search for Gender Justice, 96 Yale L.J. 914, 931-40 (1987) (book review);
Alice Kessler-Harris, Equal Opportunity Employment Commission v. Sears, Roebuck and
Company: A Personal Account, 35 Radical Hist. Rev. 57, 68, 72 (1986); Robin West, Collo-
quy: Submission, Choice and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1449,
1455-56 (1986). At the turn of the century, Charlotte Perkins Gilman warned against assump-
tions about men's and women's choices. See Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Women and Econom-
ics 8, 141-68 (3d ed. 1900). For a comprehensive look at the analyses developed to challenge
the traditional individual choice model, see Deborah Rhode, Justice and Gender 165-67
(1989); Deborah Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988 Duke L.J. 1207, 1216-27.
21 Ruth H. Bloch, The Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America, 13 Signs
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ceased to be associated with the manly "virtai" required for citizenship in
a virile state, and instead became associated with feminine virtue that
belonged in the private spheres of the home, the church, and voluntary
associations.22 Bloch corrects the view that the demise of classical no-
tions of virtue led to a culture bereft of virtue, dedicated instead to an
unremitting celebration of self-interest. 23 Gradually, she argues, our so-
ciety relocated the communal, selfless values that republicanism had as-
sociated with manly virtfi into spheres allocated to women.24 As a result
of this process, between 1780 and 1830,25 women became associated with
virtue and men with self-interest in a dichotomy that crystallized two
complementary formulations that linked political and gender ideology:
the ideology of conventional femininity (what historians term the ideol-
ogy of domesticity) and the strain of mainstream liberalism that en-
shrines the importance of self-interest. 26 A close reading of Carol
Gilligan's In A Different Voice 27 suggests that this allocation persists up
to the present.
Gilligan's "different voice" resonates so deeply with contemporary
women not, as is often assumed, because she describes their behavior, but
because she describes women's voices in a more literal sense.28 Gilligan's
"conventional feminine voice" 29 reflects how conventional gender train-
ing instructs women to behave; her narratives demonstrate how many
women internalize society's mandates.30 In A Different Voice is best un-
37 (1987).
22 See id. at 42-44, 53-58; see also Linda K. Kerber, Women of The Republic: Intellect
and Ideology in Revolutionary America 265-88 (1980) (noting that ambivalent relationship
between motherhood and citizenship would be one of most lasting and paradoxical legacies of
revolutionary generation; women decided what Revolution meant to them as women and be-
gan to invent ideology of citizenship that merged domesticity of pre-industrial women with
new public ideology of individual responsibility and civic virtue). For a fascinating study of
the relationship of republicanism and male gender ideology, see generally Hanna F. Pitkin,
Fortune is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the Thought of Niccolo Machiavelli (1984).
23 Bloch, supra note 21, at 53-58.
24 Id.
25 The analysis of the ideology of domesticity presented in this paragraph is drawn from
Nancy F. Cott, The Bonds of Womanhood: Woman's Sphere in New England, 1780-1835, 63-
74 (1977). For an insightful article that places Cott's analysis in historiographical context, see
Linda K. Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman's Place: The Rhetoric of
Women's History, 75 J. Am. Hist. 9 (1988).
26 See Joan C. Williams, Domesticity as the Dangerous Supplement of Liberalism, 2 J.
Women's Hist. 69, 78 (1991). Only much later did self-interest ideology come to dominate
mainstream liberalism. See James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism, 74 J. Am. Hist.
9 (1987). Another implication of Kloppenberg's work is that self-interest ideology has domi-
nated liberalism only intermittently. Id. at 30.
27 Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice (1982).
28 Williams, supra note 26, at 69, 69-76.
29 Id. at 71, 79-80.
30 See id. at 71. I do not mean to assert that all women do. See Carol Gilligan, Moral
Orientation and Moral Development, in Women in Moral Theory 25 (Eva Feder Kittay and
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derstood as a status report on female gender ideology.
One of Gilligan's crucial findings is that "femininity" retains major
components of the ideology of domesticity. 31 Domesticity saw mother-
hood as the central and defining female role, the mother as nurturant and
empathic. 32 Domesticity, moreover, associated mothers with a selfless-
ness that gave them elevated moral status: only by giving up self-interest
and living for others could women achieve the purity that established
them as moral reference points both for their families and for society at
large.33 Gilligan's data suggests that the theme of selflessness remains
strong in the ideology of contemporary femininity.34 Her interviewees
equate "goodness with self-sacrifice," 35 often referring to the influence of
their mothers: "endlessly giving,"'36 "selfless," 37 and "example[s] of hard
work, patience and self-sacrifice." '38
If Gilligan describes the different voice of women in the language of
domesticity, she describes its opposite in the language of liberalism. Gil-
ligan picks up on the liberalism embedded in Lawrence Kohlberg's de-
scription of the stages of moral development. She contrasts women's
voices with Kohlberg's "morality of rights and noninterference," 39 which
Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987) (reporting study in which equal proportions of women focused on
justice and on care; with one exception, no man focused on care); Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel
R. Ortiz, In A Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism, Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal
Agenda 16-17 & n.57 (1992) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (analyzing complex
relationship of the "different voice" and behavior of men and women). Although large num-
bers of women support the ideology of selfless motherhood, men may well support it in higher
proportions than women. One study of professional women found that half of the women, but
two-thirds of the men, agreed that "[e]ven if a woman has the ability and interest, she should
not choose a career field that will be difficult to combine with childbearing;" half of the
women, but only one-third of the men, approved of a mother of pre-schoolers taking a part-
time job. See Alice Rossi, Barriers to the Career Choice of Engineering, Medicine or Science
Among American Women, in Women and the Scientific Professions (Jacquelyn Mattfield and
Carol van Aken eds., 1965), quoted in M. Rivka Polatnick, Why Men Don't Rear Children: A
Power Analysis, in Mothering 21, 27 (Joyce Trebicot ed., 1983).
31 Id. at 71.
32 See Ruth H. Bloch, American Feminine Ideals in Transition: The Rise of The Moral
Mother, 1785-1815, 4 Feminist Stud. 101 (1978) (analyzing 18th to 20th century American
literature bearing on question of mothering).
33 Id. at 116, 120.
34 C. Gilligan, supra note 27, at 70-71. The selfish/selfless dichotomy also is important to
antifeminist women. See Jane Sherron De Hart, Gender on the Right: Meanings Behind the
Existential Scream, 3 Gender & Hist. 246, 253 (1991) (quoting ERA opponent: "Feminists
praise self-centeredness and call it liberation"); see also id. at 254 (self-sacrifice is virtue that
makes family life possible).
35 C. Gilligan, supra note 27, at 70. One woman described the "moral person [as] one who
helps others; goodness is service, meeting one's obligations and responsibilities to others, if
possible without sacrificing oneself." Id. at 65-66.
36 Id. at 54.
37 Id. at 136.
38 Id. at 93.
39 Id. at 22. See also id. at 18-19 (discussing Kohlberg's theories).
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celebrates "separation, autonomy, individuation and natural rights," 4
and equates "maturity with personal autonomy. 4 1 All these words re-
flect the liberal image of society as a set of autonomous individuals who
produce the greater good by pursuing their own self-interest. What lib-
eral tradition celebrates as the legitimate pursuit of self-interest, however,
Gilligan discounts as merely selfish. "You go about one-fourth [for]
others and three-fourths [for] yourself," says Jake, Gilligan's paradigm
male.42
Gilligan's book, and recent work in women's history, suggest that
domesticity acts as the "dangerous supplement" of mainstream liberal
ideology.43 Jacques Derrida's notion captures the way the two ideologies
are both complementary and mutually exclusive: domesticity sets up
women's selflessness against men's pursuit of self-interest; women's focus
on humane values against men's ambition. Derrida also stresses that one
element of these formulations sets the standard by which the other is
measured: 44 one pole is associated with "femininity," but the other is the
way normal adults (not abnormally feminine ones) behave.45 Derrida's
formulation, finally, reminds us that subservient "feminine" values have
the potential to well up and destabilize the grip of the dominant liberal
ones.
Gilligan's work demonstrates the neatly matched binary opposites
integral to the covert gendering of the liberal pursuit of autonomy. One
key dichotomy is between personal affiliation and achievement. While
these attributes are not necessarily mutually exclusive (how many people
advance without "interpersonal skills"? 46), the domesticity/liberalism
force field formulates affiliation and achievement as opposites. Under-
standing this formula reveals a central aspect of the cultural arrange-
ments the domesticity/liberalism pair encodes.
The development of domestic ideology was an integral part of the
late-eighteenth-century shift from traditional, agricultural, task-oriented
labor to modem, time-disciplined industrial labor.47 Whereas traditional
society interspersed leisure, family life, and work, modem society isolates
40 Id. at 23.
41 Id. at 17.
42 Id. at 35.
43 See Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology 141-64 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans.
1976); see also Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism After Structural-
ism 85-225 (1982) (elaborating on Derrida's discussion). This argument is developed in Wil-
liams, supra note 26, at 72-73. For a discussion of the relevant work by historians of women,
see Kerber, supra note 25.
44 J. Culler, supra note 43, at 102-03.
45 C. Gilligan, supra note 27, at 96-98.
46 Note how the gender policing is enforced rhetorically. Outside the home sensitivity to
others is not "nurturing"-it is depersonalized and regendered male, a "skill."
47 N. Cott, supra note 25, at 55-74.
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"work" from family life both temporally and geographically. Domestic-
ity's polarized dichotomy between affiliation and personal achievement
explains why adults who choose to define their lives around relationships
naturally do so at the cost of status and power and adults who choose to
pursue power and status naturally do so at the expense of those in affilia-
tion with them.
This description diffuses any challenge to a system in which parent-
ing is one-sidedly allocated to the mother, who serves as the sole-source
supplier for her children's needs, and consequently is precluded from the
conventional paths to status and power premised on a "full-time" com-
mitment that is inconsistent with child-care responsibilities. The affilia-
tion/achievement dichotomy legitimized the work and family roles
developed after the Industrial Revolution by presenting them as the natu-
ral result of biological sex differences, rather than as a societal choice to
bar caregivers from the accepted patterns of adult self-development.
This societal choice is an integral part of liberalism's definition of normal
self-development as involving the pursuit of self-interest rather than, for
example, the care of others or pursuit of the common good.
The dichotomy between selfishness and responsibility is a second di-
chotomy integral to the covert gendering of the liberal individual with
rights making choices. 48 These concepts surface in Gilligan's abortion
study, in which women characterize as selfish a decision to abort on the
grounds that a pregnancy would jeopardize their careers or other
projects of self-development.49 This rhetoric signals the covert norm of
selflessness for mothers, who should eschew accepted paths of self-devel-
opment to the extent those paths conflict with their actual or potential
motherly responsibilities.
One key implication of Gilligan's data is that twentieth-century
women have a different relationship to domesticity than did women in
the nineteenth century. To simplify dramatically, nineteenth-century
women knew that their sphere was one of selflessness and affiliation and
that they were barred from the sphere of male achievement. Twentieth-
century women are not formally barred from "ambition." Yet Gilligan
documents the contexts in which twentieth-century women may feel
caught in a clash between the mandates of self-development (modeled on
48 See C. Gilligan, supra note 27, at 73 (noting "reiterative use by the women of the words
selfish and responsible in talking about moral conflict and choice."). For exploration of the
theme of selfish women in an earlier context, see Christopher Lasch, 'Selfish Women': The
Campaign to Save the American Family 1890-1920, 4 Colum. F. 24 (1975).
49 C. Gilligan, supra note 27, at 71-105; text accompanying notes 111-114 infra (discussing
right to life condemnations of abortion). As Part III of this Article discusses in detail, the
allegation of selfishness also emerges in condemnations of "working mothers." See text accom-
panying notes 372-74 infra.
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male life patterns and justified by liberalism) and the contradictory man-
dates of domesticity. Gilligan's narratives show that many twentieth-
century women internalize both "mainstream" values50 and values that
stem from domesticity. Although Gilligan tends to silence the "male"
values in her subjects, they crop up again and again. Her interviewees
want to successfully enter professions that are based on the male model:
scientists, physicians, college professors, or presidents.5 1 They are ambi-
tious. They want money and power and recognition, and many abort
fetuses that stand in the way of these ambitions.
Gilligan's data suggests not a "different voice" that consistently re-
jects autonomy and ambition, but a conflict her interviewees feel in pur-
suing their ambitions. A poignant example is Ruth, whose (second)
pregnancy conflicts with her desire for an advanced degree. She is ambi-
tious, but she distrusts that ambition because she knows it could lead her
to ignore the perceived needs of her family.5 2 To Ruth the abortion
decision
would [mean] acknowledgement to me that I am an ambitious
person and I want to have power and responsibility for others
and that I want to have a life that extends from 9 to 5 every day
and into the evenings and on weekends, because that is what the
power and responsibility mean. It means that my family would
necessarily come second.5 3
It seems odd that Gilligan cites Ruth's interview as evidence of a "differ-
ent voice" that favors affiliation over ambition, given that this woman
likely had an abortion.54 Ruth's interview reads more accurately as the
lament of a woman caught in a matrix of irresolvable conflicts of ideol-
ogy and social role. On the one hand, Ruth believes that successful
parenthood is a key to adult fulfillment. On the other hand, she also
appears to believe that professional "success" is her birthright.5 5 She
feels conflicted because she knows that to achieve success she must act
like an ideal worker-working eight hours a day as well as overtime-a
50 However, Gilligan relied in part on a study of Harvard College students who could be
expected to identify more than would the general population with norms of career success
traditionally associated with males. She also relied in part on a study of women who were
particularly conflicted about abortion decisions, for whom issues concerning motherhood and
selflessness were evidently more troubling than for many other women. For a listing of criti-
ques of Gilligan's theory and methodology, see Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 30, at n.57.
51 C. Gilligan, supra note 27, at 101.
52 Id. at 96.
53 Id. at 97.
54 Only four of the 29 subjects interviewed by Gilligan decided to carry their pregnancies
to term. Twenty-one women had abortions, two miscarried, and two could not be contacted to
determine their decisions. Id. at 72.
55 Ruth's apparent conviction that she is entitled to professional success reflects class privi-
lege. Clearly, many poor and working-class women would not feel the same entitlement.
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lifestyle that she believes precludes her ability to meet the legitimate
needs of children.
The interview with Ruth reveals a woman caught in a society in
which self-development involves selfishness. To pursue conventional
"success," one must be selfish within the family, for one must either ig-
nore the needs of one's children or appropriate one's spouse's labor, ordi-
narily at the cost of the spouse's "success." Success involves selfishness
outside the family as well, in the realm of economic "man" (gender in-
tended) pursuing his own self-interest.
Gilligan could read her interview with Ruth-and many others-in
this way. To explore fully the conflict Gilligan notes between femininity
and adulthood, she would have to challenge both the norms of femininity
and those of "normal" adulthood.5 6 Instead, much of Gilligan's analysis
merely reports-and reifies as "women's voice"-the process by which
women traditionally have convinced themselves to sacrifice self-develop-
ment in favor of their responsibilities to children. Ruth's attempts to do
so emerge in the following excerpt.
To be ambitious means to be power hungry and insensitive.
Why insensitive? Because people are stomped on in the process.
A person on the way up stomps on people, whether it is family
or other colleagues or clientele. Inevitably? Not always, but I
have seen it so often in my limited years of working that it is
scary to me. It is scary because I don't want to change like
that.57
Here, Ruth projects an extraordinarily negative image of the professional
life she also wants. Not only do professionals have to ignore their chil-
dren, she seems to be saying; they have to treat people in the workplace
in an uncaring and manipulative manner.
In fact, of course, they do not have to, and most adults' projects of
self-development do not require them to "stomp" methodically on other
people. One might say Ruth's formulation is part of the process of talk-
ing herself out of her own ambition. This would be accurate as far as it
goes, but the notion of domesticity as dangerous supplement again pro-
vides the link between political and gender ideology. Ruth is mobilizing
domesticity's critique of self-interest.
In its original context, domesticity's critique asserted that true
women wanted none of "that bank note world" 58 of paltry money grub-
56 See C. Gilligan, supra note 27, at 97 (discussing clash between femininity and adult-
hood). Part of In A Different Voice challenges these norms. For an insightful discussion of the
tension within Gilligan's book, see Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 30, at 38-45.
57 C. Gilligan, supra note 27, at 97 (parenthesis in original).
58 N. Cott, supra note 25, at 68.
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bing and alienated human relations. Domesticity articulated an internal
critique of capitalism, a "cri de coeur against modem work relations,"5 9
and simultaneously established the home as a haven from the heartless
world of nineteenth-century capitalismA0 Ruth's negative characteriza-
tion of work life mirrors domesticity's critique of modem work relations.
This critique is the "danger" that threatens to destabilize the liberal/
capitalist mainstream, yet Ruth's formulation also shows how domestic
ideology serves to defuse this threat. Her critique occurs not in the con-
text of an argument that a world in which "success" involves "stomping"
is immoral and should change; instead, the thrust of her argument is that
success is undesirable. The language of conventional femininity encour-
ages women to characterize their inability simultaneously to achieve suc-
cess and to meet the needs of their children as a choice to reject a world
filled with people whose success is built upon insensitivity to the needs of
others. Domesticity turns a critique of "success as stomping" into an
argument that the speaker's disgust is so strong that she chooses not to
participate in such a world.
In Ruth, and in many other professional women of our generation
(myself included), the first gender war thus emerges. It is a gender war
within Ruth herself. Her ambivalence is about the extent to which she
wants to remain true to the ideology and the lifestyle of domesticity. The
part of her attracted to the ideals of domesticity conflicts deeply with
another part of her that was socialized into the culture of professional-
ism, 61 a culture that stresses self-development through one's career.62
Professional culture arose around the life patterns traditional to males.
Consequently, it clashes with many women's internalized sense of what
59 Id. at 70.
60 Id. at 68; see also Christopher Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged
(1977) (discussing importance of family ties and contemporary society's erosion of family life).
Cott explains:
In accentuating the split between "work" and "home" and proposing the latter as a
place of salvation, the canon of domesticity tacitly acknowledged the capacity of modem
work to desecrate the human spirit. Authors of domestic literature, especially the fe-
male authors, denigrated business and politics as arenas of selfishness, exertion, embar-
rassment, and degradation of soul. These authors suggested what Marx's analysis of
alienated labor in the 1840s would assert, that the worker.., feels at ease only outside
work, and during work he is outside himself. He is at home when he is not working and
when he is working he is not at home. The canon of domesticity embodied a protest
against that advance of exploitation and pecuniary values.
N. Cott, supra note 25, at 67-68.
61 See Habits, supra note 14, at 65-71 (discussing culture of professionalism in contempo-
rary American life); Burton J. Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class
and the Development of Higher Education in America 80, 87, 120 (1976) (discussing culture of
professionalism in its original mid-Victorian context).
62 See B. Bledstein, supra note 61, at 159-202 (discussing careers and decisions regarding
which profession to enter).
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mothers owe their children. 63 This internalized sense reflects the co-
vertly gendered norms within liberalism that mandate selflessness for
mothers and self-interest for others. The same norms are at work in the
contemporary controversies over abortion and "working mothers" in
which ambivalence about gender is externalized.
Traditional theorists miss this dynamic altogether. Instead, they
promulgate the formal ideology of self-development for all. This is the
self-image of contemporary liberalism, but its false gender neutrality
cripples our ability to understand crucial dynamics within American
politics and American law.64 We have seen the gender war that pits
women against themselves. Now we turn to the gender wars that pit
women against each other.65 Parts II and III analyze how the abortion
debate and the debate over "working mothers" pit women against each
other instead of uniting them against a power structure that fails to at-
tend to their needs.
II
ABORTION: SELFLESS MOTHERS IN A SELFISH WORLD66
Much like slavery before it, abortion has become an epic contro-
63 See id. at 147-58 (implying links between culture of professionalism and male gender
ideology); Joan Williams, Sameness, Feminism and the Work/Family Conflict, 35 N.Y.L. Sch.
L. Rev. 347, 352-56 (1990) (discussing contemporary firm practice as expression of gender
privilege).
64 As my analysis of Friedman's book suggests, I agree with Robin West's observation that
mainstream liberalism is in some sense "male." Unlike West, however, I define its relationship
to men. West appears to argue that liberalism reflects some innate "male" part of men's psy-
chological make-up, and her critique of liberalism reflects some innate feminine part of
women's make-up. See West, supra note 20, at 1449-50, 1455-56. Instead, I believe that liber-
alism melds political and male gender ideology: to assume that male gender ideology reflects
the actual behavior of males only helps to recreate the gender troubles we as feminists are
trying to avoid. The problem is that male gender ideology is a stunted picture of human
potential-as is the female gender ideology West embraces as "femininity." West, supra note
12, at 28-30. Our goal as feminists is to reformulate ideas of "real" man- and womanhood in
less stunted ways that do not track and reinforce current power inequities and stunted notions
of human potential.
65 For a book that explores how to develop an "ethics of criticism" in feminist practice, see
Conflicts in Feminism (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn F. Keller eds., 1990). The project is an
important one if conflicts in feminism are to avoid tracking the gender wars discussed herein.
66 For analyses of the abortion debate that focus on similar themes, see Mary Ann
Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law (1987); Ruth Colker, Abortion and Dialogue,
63 Tul. L. Rev. 1363 (1989); Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology and Abortion: Toward Love,
Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 1011 (1989); Ruth Colker, Feminist Litigation: An
Oxymoron? A Study of the Briefs Filed in William L. Webster v. Reproductive Services, 13
Harv. Women's L.J. 137 (1990) [hereinafter Colker, Feminist Litigation]; Elizabeth Mensch &
Alan Freeman, The Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology and Abortion, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 923
(1991); see also Gary Leedes, Liberalism, Republicanism and the Abortion Controversy, 35
Viii. L. Rev. 571 (1990).
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versy in which the very soul of our disquiet republic seems capa-
ble of bursting.67
The Supreme Court's 1973 declaration in Roe v. Wade68 that abor-
tion is a constitutional right69 seemed in tune with the twentieth cen-
tury's acceptance of more open sexuality and tolerance of a wider range
of options for women. Yet this case led to a cultural firestorm.70 What
makes the abortion debate so obsessive, so interminable, so central to our
country's self-definition?71 This question is especially intriguing because
until recently abortion was not a particularly divisive issue.72 Common
law permitted early abortions,73 and, in fact, abortion providers openly
advertised their services. 74 One doctor estimated that in 1860 one in ten
married women had attempted or had an abortion.75 While the public
did not condone abortion, abortion certainly was not viewed as a major
moral crisis.76
In recent years, however, the controversy over abortion has been
tremendously divisive. A wide range of feminists-from Rosalind Pet-
chesky77 to Catharine MacKinnon 78 to Mary Ann Glendon 79-have
67 Jane Maslow Cohen, Comparison-Shopping in the Marketplace of Rights, 98 Yale L.J.
1235, 1236 (1989).
68 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
69 See id. at 154.
70 Some commentators believe that public reaction to Roe v. Wade played a significant role
in the sharp shift to the right in American politics during the 1980s. See, e.g., Rosalind P.
Petchesky, Abortion and Women's Choice: The State, Sexuality and Reproductive Freedom
242-43 (1984); Mensch & Freeman, supra note 66, at 1119.
71 See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue 6-7 (2d ed. 1984) (describing interminabiity of
abortion debate).
72 See R. Petcheseky, supra note 70, at 78.
73 See James C. Mohr, Abortion in America: The Origins and Evolution of National Pol-
icy, 1800-1900, at 3-4, 265 n.1 (1978). Abortions were legal before quickening, which ordina-
rily occurs late in the fourth or early in the fifth month of pregnancy. Id.
74 See id. at 50-57 (reproducing family planning advertisements); Marlene S. Wortman,
Women in American Law: From Colonial Times to The New Deal 163-65 (1985) (same).
75 See J. Mohr, supra note 73, at 76. This doctor later increased his estimation to one in
every five women. Id. at 77. Mohr asserts that even though these estimates may be too high,
they are evidence of a dramatic increase in the rate of abortion after 1840. Id. at 46-85.
76 Historian James C. Mohr's influential study interprets the successful campaign to out-
law abortion in the nineteenth century as part of the American Medical Association's (AMA)
effort to eliminate lay medical practitiohers and to raise the status of the medical profession.
Mohr argues that between 1840 and 1860 efforts to legislate against abortion were ambiguous
and tentative. Id. at 145-46; see also id. at 147-70 (discussing "physician's crusade"). Church
leaders never got deeply involved in the issue, despite AMA efforts to recruit them. To the
extent that public opinion crystalized against abortion, concern often focused not on the fetus,
but the future of the race. See id. at 187-96. The undesirability of native-born Protestant
women having abortions, while "foreigners" (immigrants) continued to reproduce at faster
rates, was a major concern.
77 See R. Petchesky, supra note 70, at 248, 262-76 (discussing abortion and patriarchy); see
also id. at 247-52 Oinking anti-abortion movement with anti-feminist backlash and anti-social
welfare backlash).
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linked the abortion debate with male efforts to impose patriarchal au-
thority. Increasingly, however, commentators have come to realize that
abortion is also a fight among women. Women dominate the pro-choice
movement from top to bottom; below the leadership level, a majority of
right-to-life activists are also women.80 This Part analyzes the abortion
controversy as a gender war over the issue of whether women are-or
should be-citizens of the republic of choice. Part A examines how de-
mands for access to abortion come to be framed in the language of
choice. Part B explores how choice rhetoric fuels the right-to-life back-
lash, by signaling that mothers-like other adults-should act as autono-
mous, self-interested actors. Choice rhetoric therefore splits women in a
war over gender roles; specifically, over whether women should act with
the selflessness traditionally allocated to mothers or whether they should
pursue autonomy in ways traditionally associated with men. Part C ex-
plores how to redesign abortion rhetoric to make domesticity work for,
rather than against, the pro-choice position.
A. The Early History of Abortion Rhetoric: From Reproductive
Freedom to "Choice"
Abortion was a central issue in the second wave of American femi-
nism,81 but feminists did not agree on what access to abortion should
entail.82 To many radical feminists, abortion on demand had at least two
crucial components. First, abortion on demand was seen as a way to
establish that women were competent as moral agents. Women should
be free of the need to justify their reproduction decisions to hospital com-
78 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in Feminism
Unmodified 93, 97 (1987) (arguing that "[r]eproduction is sexual, men control sexuality, and
the state supports the interest of men as a group"); id. at 99 (access to abortion is in men's
interest because "'[g]etting laid was at stake,'" (quoting Andrea Dworkin, Right Wing
Women (1983))); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rethinking Sex Equality Under Law, 100 Yale
L.J. 1281, 1298-1324 (1991)(proposing new theory supporting abortion rights); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male Ideology, in Abortion 45 (Jay L. Garfield &
Patricia Hennessey eds., 1984) (critique of privacy framework).
79 M. Glendon, supra note 66, at 50-52 (suggesting that strongest advocacy of abortion
comes from men: abortion as "wall" to screen men's domination of women).
80 See Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood 126-57 (1984) (studying
abortion activists in California, and finding shifting profile of right-to-life activists-from
Catholic male professionals between 1959 and 1967 to high-school educated, married women
with children after 1973); see also Faye D. Ginsburg, Contested Lives 134 (1989) (membership
of both pro-choice and right-to-life groups is predominantly female). See generally Susan Har-
ding, Family Reform Movements: Recent Feminism and Its Opposition, 7 Feminist Stud. 57
(1981).
81 See Alice Echols, Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America, 1967-1975, at 174-
75 (1989) (history of second-wave radical feminism).
82 For a detailed discussion of what Petchesky calls the split between "feminists and liber-
tarians," see R. Petchesky, supra note 70, at 125-32.
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mittees who "[sit] around splitting hairs over how sick or poor or multip-
arous a pregnant woman ha[s] to be to deserve exemption from
reproductive duty."'83
Second, the cry for abortion on demand was based on the notion
that all women should have access to abortion regardless of income.
Many radical feminists linked their commitment to abortion with hostil-
ity to a medical establishment they viewed as elitist, overly scientistic,
and patriarchal. 84 Activists in the women's health movement worked
towards transformation of the American medical system by opening clin-
ics that offered low-cost abortions, often run in a nonhierarchical way by
people without medical credentials. These clinics emphasized self-help
and sisterly support,8 5 somewhat in the manner of birthing centers run
by midwives today. Abortion on demand was linked with a vision of
society that looked towards liberation through a deep and sweeping re-
construction of the framework of women's lives. Dierdre English articu-
lated this vision in 1981:
A complete feminist reproductive politics must be a social and
moral blueprint. It cannot end with the guarantee of the right to
terminate a pregnancy: it must go on to include the right to
have children, without supporting each child's existence at the
sole expense of his or her mother. And that right cannot be
separated from the rest of the feminist program of total equality.
Reproductive rights must mean financial equality, so that
women can raise children without being impoverished. There
must be practical child-care support for working mothers and a
complete turnabout in male responsibility for parenthood. Yet
the individual right to have an abortion must remain at the heart
of the feminist position.86
Liberal abortion advocates had no such sweeping vision. Moreover,
most often they were content to leave abortion to the medical establish-
ment-to the "private" decision of the woman and her doctor.8 7 This
framework also appealed to the family planning establishment and to the
AMA, which played an activist role in getting abortion restrictions abol-
ished,88 much as it had been influential a century earlier in getting them
83 Id. at 125 (quoting Ellen Willis, Village Voice, Mar. 3, 1980, at 8).
84 Id. at 126-29.
85 Id. at 128-29.
86 Dierdre English, The War Against Choice: Inside the Anti-abortion Movement, Mother
Jones, Feb./Mar. 1981, at 16, 32.
87 Id. at 291-92.
88 See R. Petchesky, supra note 70, at 123-32 (arguing that at particular moment in his-
tory, social need, feminist activism, and populist ideology came together to change state
policy).
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passed. 89
Both radical and liberal abortion activists used liberal rhetoric to
express their quite different goals. The radical feminist slogan of "Get
the State's law off our bodies" 9 mobilized libertarian language to stress
women's demands for freedom from governmental control, not their
preference for a more communal, nonhierarchical, nonscientistic society.
The liberals' language of choice also emphasized the theme of freedom
from governmental control, harking back to the notion that society will
be better off if individuals are free to make choices in their own self-
interest.91
As abortion rights entered the judicial sphere, the radical rhetoric of
abortion on demand was submerged into the liberal rhetoric of choice.
The district court in Roe v. Wade 92 spoke of the "fundamental right...
to choose;"' 93 Justice Stewart's concurrence formulated the issue as in-
volving the "freedom of personal choice; ' 94 the majority opinion noted:
"The detriment that the state would impose upon the pregnant woman
by denying this choice altogether is apparent." 95 Roe also stressed the
relationship between the woman and her doctor,96 thereby placing the
abortion decision safely within a hierarchical, patriarchal context. 97
Gone was the radical feminist challenge to the medical system. Finally,
Roe's privacy rhetoric opened the door to the subsequent decisions up-
holding the government's right to deny abortion funding for poor
women.
98
The language of Roe resonates with Friedman's republic of choice.
Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, even used the rhetoric of life-
style, which Friedman correctly identifies as central to notions of self-
development in the twentieth-century:
89 See J. Mohr, supra note 73, at 147-70.
90 See R. Petchesky, supra note 70, at 131.
91 See A. Echols, supra note 81, at 285 (emphasizing difference between radical and liberal
abortion rights advocates).
92 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
93 Id. at 1225.
94 Roe, 410 U.S. at 169 (Stewart, J., concurring).
95 Id. at 153.
96 Id. (emphasis added) (stating that "right to privacy... is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy and that "the women and her
responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation" factors that go into decision).
97 See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 995, 1020
(1984) (arguing that Roe gives doctors undue power over abortion decisions).
98 See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 311 (1980) (states not required to pay for
medically necessary abortions for which Hyde Amendment blocks federal funding); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1976) (states not required to provide Medicaid funding for non-thera-
peutic abortions, even if they finance expenses incident to childbirth); see also Colker, Feminist
Litigation, supra note 66, at 177 (discussing how Roe's privacy argument was embedded in
individualistic framework that resulted in Harris decision).
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The clear message of these cases-[is] that a woman is free to
make the basic decision whether to bear an unwanted child.
Elaborate argument is hardly necessary to demonstrate that
childbirth may deprive a woman of her preferred lifestyle and
force upon her a radically different and undesired future.99
The majority opinion did not use the language of lifestyle, but its listing
of reasons why women might want to abort clearly embraces what pro-
life advocates would consider lifestyle concerns.10° The central message
of Roe is that women should be free to choose abortion because un-
wanted pregnancy violates their autonomy and their freedom to control
their own lives.101 Liberty, autonomy, choice: underlying this rhetoric is
the image of autonomous actors creating the greatest good by pursuing
their own self-interest.
When viewed from the perspective of the split in the women's move-
ment over abortion, Roe tends not only to confirm Friedman's thesis that
contemporary American law gravitates towards the rhetoric of choice,
but also to show how that legal rhetoric serves to siphon off deeper chal-
lenges to our scientistic, capitalist society as part of the process of mak-
ing political demands into legal ones. This same process encourages
women to frame issues in terminology that leads to gender wars. The
image of mothers aborting to pursue their autonomy is deeply alienating
to women who accept the traditional gendered allocation of selflessness
and self-interest.
B. How the Rhetoric of Choice Fuels the Right-to-Life Backlash
Recent feminist commentary stresses that the woman is absent from
right-to-life rhetoric: the fetus is considered alone, an autonomous actor
suspended in amniotic fluid.10 2 This blindness to the woman is part of a
larger pattern of blindness that stems from the standard imagery of indi-
viduals with rights making choices. Viewing the fetus as an autonomous
individual dramatizes with extraordinary vividness how this imagery can
erase individuals' dependence upon those who sustain their social and
physical life. The right-to-life images of aborting women that follow pro-
vide a better understanding of the role this imagery plays in the abortion
99 Roe, 410 U.S. at 214 (Douglas, J., concurring); see L. Friedman, supra note 6, at 162-87
("The Life-Style Society"); see also K. Luker, supra note 80, at 189-90 (pro-choice activists
often speak in terms of "quality of life," thereby evoking "a pleasing vista of the human intel-
lect directed to resolving the complicated problems of life").
100 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 ("a distressful life and future," "psychological harm," and
"distress.").
101 See id.
102 See, e.g., Rosalind P. Petchesky, Fetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the
Politics of Reproduction, 13 Feminist Stud. 263, 271 (1987) (fetus as "autonomous, atomized
mini-space hero").
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debate.
1. Right-to-Life Images of Aborting Women
The classic fight-to-life imagery of the aborting woman appears in
Justice White's dissent in Doe v. Bolton. 103 "At the heart of the contro-
versy," the dissent begins, are those pregnancies that do not threaten the
health of the mother but nonetheless are unwanted for a variety of rea-
sons: "convenience, family planning, economics, dislike of children, the
embarrassment of illegitimacy, etc." 1 4 The Roe majority, the dissent
charges, holds that "the Constitution of the United States values the con-
venience, whim, or caprice of the [pregnant woman] more than the life or
potential life of the fetus."' 0 5 This convenience rhetoric-the classic
charge of the right-to-life movementl 6-proves central as the first list of
possible motivations is collapsed one paragraph later into the notion that
fetal life needs protection against the convenience, whim, or caprice of its
mother.
At their most aggressive, fight-to-life narratives paint two images of
aborting women.107 One is the apocryphal yuppie who aborts to avoid
missing her upcoming vacation. The other is the "feckless, promiscuous
ghetto teenager who couldn't bring herself to just say no to sex."10 8 The
Roe dissent is clear about why abortions of pregnant teenagers 0 9 are the
products of "mere convenience." In that instance, the dissent implies,
fetal life is destroyed to avoid the embarrassment of illegitimacy.110
Contemporary right-to-life rhetoric most often limits the charge of
"convenience" to abortions of healthy fetuses by married women for rea-
sons of self-development: to pursue educational or career goals or a life
of one's own. A vivid example emerged when Maude, the married hero-
103 410 U.S. 179, 221 (White, J., dissenting; joined by Rehnquist, J.) (companion case to
Roe).
104 Id. (White, J. dissenting).
105 Id. (White, J. dissenting).
106 This charge infuriates the pro-choice proponents. See Ellen Willis, Village Voice, Mar.
3, 1980, at 8 "as if unwanted pregnancy were an annoyance comparable to... standing in a
long line at the supermarket."), quoted in Petchesky, supra note 102, at 126.
107 See Mary Gordon, A Moral Choice, Atlantic Monthly, Apr. 1990, at 78. A third stereo-
type is that of the woman who aborts because she is "the dupe of her husband or boyfriend,
who tricks her into having an abortion because a child will be a drag on his life-style." Id. at
80.
108 Id. at 78.
109 One out of every ten teenagers in this country becomes pregnant. See S. Rep. No. 161,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1981), quoted in Cohen, supra note 67, at 1237 n.8.
110 This argument, while clever, is unusual in contemporary right-to-life rhetoric. More
standard approaches argue that teenagers should place their blameless babies up for adoption
or that permitting abortions just encourages teenagers to have irresponsible sex. The dissent's
convenience argument deftly avoids the need to admit its disapproval of sex outside of
marriage.
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ine of the television series by that name, obtained an abortion in 1973 on
the grounds that at age fifty she was too old to devote her life to a baby.
Right-to-life groups decried her decision as a "convenience abortion"
and said the program "preached individual selfishness." '111
A study of prime-time television by Celeste Condit suggests that
American television represents a "consensus narrative" on abortion.1 12
Condit argues that prime-time television consistently depicts as immoral
the abortion of a healthy fetus by a woman who is married or otherwise
has a man to support her.113 For example, in an episode of Spenser for
Hire, Spencer's girlfriend vividly demonstrates the fate of the radical
feminist demand for access to abortion to control one's life.
Susan: Saying it out loud makes it sound so selfish, but dammit,
this is just the worst time for this to have happened.
Spenser: Worst time? Do you think there'd ever be a perfect
time, Suse?... Convenience, is that what we are talking about
here? I love you, and I know you too well to think that your
motives would ever be selfish.... [He goes on to interpret her
reluctance as a fear that he would not be able to be a good fa-
ther. She denies that and continues.]
Susan: What I'm really talking about is independence. All my
life I've depended on someone. First my parents, then Frank.
I'm finally at a point where I can stand on my own and feel
some control over my own life-make decisions based on what I
want. If I have a baby now I'll lose that. So maybe it is selfish.
Spenser: Susan, I understand about independence. About peo-
ple making decisions. About being controlled or forced. But
this decision is not yours alone. It's mine, too. I've got a re-
sponsibility here.... I want it. I'm prepared for it.... This
baby has a right to live.
Susan: What if I don't think it's a baby yet? What if I think
there is still a choice?114
This program was unusual in that the woman eventually aborted. More
often, Condit found, pregnant women whose pregnancies conflicted with
their careers or other plans for self-development chose not to abort, only
to miscarry with becoming grief.115
Condit's study suggests the linkage between abortion and the debate
111 See Celeste Michelle Condit, Decoding Abortion Rhetoric 124 (1990).
112 Id. at 123.
113 Id. at 125-41.
114 Id. at 137.
115 "1 didn't want it," said Vanessa Sarnouk in Call to Glory, "It must have known." Id. at
135-36. Particularly since Vanessa was an electronics major, this episode seems designed to
dramatize the tension between motherhood and the demands of nontraditional careers.
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over "working mothers": both involve controversies over the extent to
which mothers are entitled to self-development if it competes with the
demands of motherhood as conventionally defined. Condit's analysis
shows why the abortion debate ends up pitting women more invested in
motherhood against women more invested in careers or other types of
self-development unrelated to domesticity. The remainder of this section
explores how this occurs, focusing on two recent studies that examine the
abortion controversy as a gender war among women.
In the earlier study, sociologist Kristin Luker 1 6 examined abortion
activists in California, finding very different profiles of pro-choice and
right-to-life proponents. The typical pro-choice activist, Luker found, is
a woman with a serious career commitment. Luker traces the activism of
these pro-choice advocates to their belief that their professional success
depended in part on their ability to control their fertility. "Once [pro-
choice activists] had choices about life roles," she writes, "they came to
feel that they had a right to use abortion in order to control their own
lives."' 7 Highlighting the connection between pro-choice activism and
the awareness of the "opportunity cost" of pregnancy, Luker's study sug-
gests that pro-choice activists demand a right to abort if a pregnancy
interferes with their right to self-development, in contexts in which self-
development most often is associated with career success. 11 8
According to Luker's study, fight-to-life advocates are predomi-
nantly women.119 In contrast to their opponents, they tend to be work-
ing class women with high school educations who identify primarily with
motherhood. They also tend to hold "traditional" views that "men are
best suited to the public world of work, and women are best suited to
rear children, manage homes, and love and care for husbands."' 120
The more recent work of anthropologist Faye Ginsburg partly criti-
cizes and partly confirms Luker's study.1 21 Ginsburg challenges Luker's
class-based categories, concluding that middle and working class women
are represented on both sides of the abortion debate.1 22 Ginsburg found
that age was a key difference between the pro-choice and right-to-life
116 See K. Luker, supra note 80. For an insightful interpretation of the abortion debate that
relies heavily on Luker, see Jean Braucher, Tribal Conflict Over Abortion, 25 Ga. L. Rev. 595
(1991) (book review).
117 K. Luker, supra note 80, at 118 (emphasis in original).
118 Id. at 118-21.
119 Id. at 94.
120 Id. at 160.
121 See F. Ginsburg, supra note 80.
122 Id. at 139, 150, 174. Ginsburg considered the activists' natal and current households.
Conducted in Fargo, North Dakota, Ginsburg's study analyzed data from 21 right-to-life ac-
tivists and 14 pro-choice activists. Each activist reflected the range of diversity found in the
active membership of each group with respect to age, socioeconomic status, religious affilia-
tion, household and marriage arrangements, and style of activism. Id at 134-35.
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activists she studied.123 The pro-choice activists came of age in the six-
ties and seventies and defined their lives in terms of the feminist rebellion
against the traditional pattern of women's lives. Right-to-life advocates
tended to be younger; their life-defining step often was their decision to
drop out of the workforce. 124
Although Ginsburg presents her study as a challenge to Luker,125
their conclusions in fact are reconcilable. In both studies, pro-choice ac-
tivists and their opponents differ in their orientation towards domesticity.
Although, as Ginsburg correctly notes, both pro-choice and right-to-life
women identify with domesticity, 126 a split occurs between American
women who unambivalently adopt the ideology of domesticity and those
who-to use Gilligan's terminology-remain torn between a femininity
that rests on the ideology of domesticity and a definition of adulthood
that adopts the imagery of autonomous actors pursuing self-develop-
ment. 127 In short, the abortion debate is a second gender war precipi-
tated by the clash between femininity and adulthood.1 28
The remainder of this section explores how the right-to-life move-
ment embeds domesticity's critique of the pursuit of self-interest. Section
C then describes two avenues that hold promise for helping abortion
rights activists reclaim control of the abortion debate, and evaluates their
potential for success.
2. Domesticity's Critique of Self-Interest
The analysis of domesticity developed in Part I offers insight into
the logic of right-to-life advocates. Many women, Ginsberg's study sug-
gests, are attracted by domesticity's critique of self-interest. Said one
right-to-life advocate:
I think we've accepted abortion because we're a very materialis-
tic society and there is less time for caring. To me it's all re-
lated. Housewives don't mean much because we do the caring
and the mothering kinds of things which are not as important as
a nice house or a new car. 129
123 Id. at 140.
124 Id. at 140-45.
125 Id. at 150, 173 (focusing particularly on Luker's finding of class differential among pro-
choice and right-to-life advocates).
126 See id. at 152-97; text accompanying notes 49-63 supra. The ideology of domesticity is
so closely tied with gender-training in femininity that many women identify with its norms to
some extent. See text accompanying notes 50-65 supra.
127 This formulation postulates two groups of women. In fact, as I will argue in the context
of work/family conflict, American women probably fall more along a continuum ranging from
least to most ambivalent about domesticity. See text accompanying notes 371-72 infra.
128 See text accompanying notes 55-56 infra.
129 F. Ginsburg, supra note 80, at 185.
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Right-to-life advocates are the modem day "moral mothers."130 They
use the language of traditional femininity to critique the liberal premise
that society is better off if adults pursue their own self-interest. Ginsburg
found many right-to-life mothers articulating "an embedded critique" in
which nurturance challenges the negative social forces of materialism
and competitive individualism.13 1 The women she interviewed see their
right-to-life stance as part of a system of values that chooses nurturance
over "success." 132 The man's world of self-interest is belittled as selfish
and materialistic, in contrast to the maternal world of "unconditional
nurturance." 133
Right-to-life advocates, vague and often ambivalent about whether
the pursuit of self-interest is acceptable for men, are united by the theme
that self-interest is unacceptable for mothers and destructive for society
at large.134 Linda Gordon aptly summarized their feelings:
[Abortion opponents] fear a completely individualized society
with all services based on cash nexus relationships, without the
influence of nurturing women counteracting the completely ego-
istic principles of the economy, and without any forms in which
children can learn about lasting human commitments to other
people.135
Women in Ginsburg's right-to-life narratives often depict their decisions
to eschew employment as a sacrifice-usually because the loss of a sec-
ond income makes money tight-that is worth making for the good of
their children: "Kids are what it boils down to. My husband and I re-
ally prize them; they are our future and that is what we feel is the root of
the whole pro-life thing." 136
130 See text accompanying notes 31-33 infra.
131 F. Ginsberg, supra note 80, at 196.
132 See id. at 188.
133 Id. at 190.
134 Id. at 195-96.
135 Linda Gordon, Why Nineteenth-Century Feminists Did Not Support "Birth Control"
and Twentieth-Century Feminists Do: Feminism, Reproduction, and the Family, in Rethink-
ing the Family: Some Feminist Questions 40, 51 (Barrie Thorne & Marilyn Yalom eds., 1982),
quoted in F. Ginsburg, supra note 80, at 196.
136 F. Ginsburg, supra note 80, at 193. These right-to-life women depict the mother's deci-
sion as a family, not an individual, sacrifice. See text accompanying notes 380-81 infra. Do-
mesticity's critique of possessive individualism emerges as well among academic feminists who
have challenged Roe v. Wade as excessively "atomistic." See, e.g., Elizabeth Fox-Genovese,
Feminism Without Illusions 7-9, 199-241 (1991) (criticizing feminist acceptance of individual-
ism); M. Glendon, supra note 66, at 35-39, 112-25 (criticizing excessive individualism in abor-
tion cases and in American life); R. Petchesky, supra note 70, at 3-8 (criticizing "bourgeois
individualism"); Colker, Feminist Litigation, supra note 66, at 165-67, 181-82 (criticizing pri-
vacy abortion decisions as too atomistic); Robin West, Foreward: Taking Freedom Seriously,
104 Harv. L. Rev. 43 (1990) (proposing responsibility as opposed to rights theory). For a
critical response, see Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy (1991) (unpublished manu-
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Many Americans share right-to-life advocates' uneasiness about a
trade-off between the needs of children and adults' pursuit of self-devel-
opment. Although work or schooling aspirations often contribute to de-
cisions in favor of abortion, 13 7 large numbers of Americans disapprove of
abortion for these reasons. For example, only one-third of Americans
think abortion should be legal if the decision is based on a woman's de-
sire to pursue career opportunities, 138 a figure that appears to confirm the
disapproval of "selfish mothers" documented by Condit's study of media
imagery.1 3 9 The covert norm of selflessness for mothers emerges again in
data documenting widespread disapproval of abortion to allow teenagers
to finish school.140 This, too, can be viewed as a trade-off between self-
development and caregiving-if one ignores the fact that it often is not a
high-profile job pregnant teenagers seek, but avoidance of the grinding
poverty characteristic of teenage motherhood. 141 Most dramatically,
only forty-nine percent of Americans think abortion should be legal for
mothers in low-income families that cannot afford more children.1 42
Here lurks the image of a mother choosing a pair of expensive sneakers
script on file with author).
137 See Torres & Forrest, supra note 2, at 179 (discussing reasons underlying abortion
decision).
138 R.W. Apple, Jr., Limits on Abortion Seem Less Likely, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1989, at
Al. This low percentage may be attributable in part to the wording of the question, which
projected the image of an affluent career woman aborting to preserve her next promotion.
These results are based on a New York Times/CBS News Poll taken from September 17-20,
1989, having a margin of sampling error of 3%. Id. at Al, A13. An earlier poll reported that
56% of respondents said that abortion should be illegal in these circumstances. E.J. Dionne,
Jr., Poll Finds Ambivalence on Abortion Persists in U.S., N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1989, at A18.
139 See C. Condit, supra note 11, at 137-38 (documenting use of word "selfish"); id. at 133
(documenting cultural message that abortions not justifiable for married women absent finan-
cial destitution). For a nineteenth-century variation on this theme, see R. Petchesky, supra
note 70, at 75-76; see also Katrina Maxtone-Graham, Pregnant By Mistake 31 (1973) (quoting
aborting woman: "They tell you you're so selfish when you don't want a child.").
140 See Dionne, supra note 138, at AIS (discussing results of poll in which only 44% of
those surveyed said abortion should be legal if sought to enable teenager to finish school). This
New York Times/CBS News poll was based on telephone interviews conducted July 25-30,
1989. Id. Nationwide, 978 adults were surveyed and the sampling error was 3%. Id. In these
statistics, the norm of selflessness may be only part of the dynamic since the relationship be-
tween domestic ideology and women of color and working class women is very complex. See
Letter from Angela Harris to Joan Williams, Jan. 19, 1992 (on file with author).
141 Nancy M. Rudd, Patrick C. McKenry, & Myungkyun Nah, Welfare Receipt Among
Black and White Adolescent Mothers, 11 Fam. Issues 334, 337 (1990) (30% of youth-headed
families had incomes below poverty line in 1985, compared to 11% of general population); see
Greg J. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, Welfare Benefits, Economic Opportunities, and Out-of-
Wedlock Births Among Black Teenage Girls, 27 Demography 519 (1990) (children born to
unmarried teenage mothers likely to spend childhoods in poverty; mothers lose career and
marriage opportunities, and their own childhoods).
142 See Apple, supra note 138, at A13. About two-thirds of the women surveyed by Torres
& Forrest indicated that one reason for their abortion was that they could not afford another
child at that time. See Torres & Forrest, supra note 2, at 169.
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for her teenager over the sanctity of fetal life-the pervasive theme of
short-sighted and materialistic women.
Abortion has such a hold on the American psyche in part because it
enables Americans to express their uneasiness over our national celebra-
tion of self-interest and materialism without confronting unpleasant facts
about our national priorities; instead, the abortion controversy allocates
the blame to mothers who refuse to abide by norms of selflessness. Pro-
choice advocates exacerbate this dynamic when they express their goal as
support for "abortion on demand and without apology."1 43 To many
Americans, this conjures up an image of selfish women and unnurtured
children in a harsh, uncaring society. 144
C. Reframing Abortion Rhetoric
This analysis suggests that current abortion rights rhetoric carries
significant costs. The need to reassess that rhetoric seems particularly
pressing today. Most rural women no longer have access to abortion,
and fewer and fewer doctors are trained to perform abortions so that
even urban clinics have trouble finding such doctors.145 These patterns
have emerged despite the continued validity of Roe v. Wade.146 If, as is
widely expected, the Supreme Court overrules Roe or continues to erode
its guarantee,1 47 the abortion debate will leave the courtroom and reenter
the legislative arena.
In this context, abortion rights advocates need to reassess the effec-
tiveness of current abortion rhetoric. When the defense of access to abor-
tion was based on constitutional arguments, the rhetoric of choice made
sense: indeed, as we have seen, advocates for reproductive freedom be-
came "pro-choice" advocates in part because of the demands of legal
discourse.148 Yet choice rhetoric is not the simple, unadulterated truth
of women's lives: many aborting women feel they have no choice but to
abort.1 49 The rhetoric has been strategic from the beginning, not expres-
sive of pristine, unchanging truths.'50
143 "Abortion on demand and without apology" is a common pro-choice slogan.
144 While this is not the only fear underlying the abortion debate, it is both important and
often unrecognized.
145 Recent research is summarized in National Abortion Federation, Who Will Provide
Abortions?, Recommendations from a National Symposium, Santa Barbara, Cal. (Oct. 25-26,
1990).
146 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
147 See Greenhouse, supra note 5, at Al.
148 See text accompanying notes 81-101 supra.
149 See Kathleen McDonnell, Not an Easy Choice 71 (1984) (many women feel they have
"no choice" but to abort); see also Meridel Le Suer, The Girl 76-81 (1978) (story stressing role
of male power in abortion decision); Gloria Naylor, The Women of Brewster Place 91-98
(1980) (same).
150 Cf. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) (arguing that knowl-
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The remainder of this section explores how to reframe the abortion
debate to help diffuse the gender war over abortion. Section 1 explores
the scope of the problem and concludes that the abortion controversy is
not an auspicious context in which to press feminist claims for auton-
omy. 15' Section 2 focuses on abortion rhetoric. It separates two strains
of pro-choice rhetoric, and argues that pro-choice advocates need to
regain control of the subtext of the abortion debate: the narratives of
aborting women.
L Abortion as a No-Win Issue
Second-wave feminists made a conscious choice to use abortion as a
vehicle for pressing women's claim to self-possession and autonomy. 152
Yet the course of the abortion debate in the past twenty-five years sug-
gests that abortion may not be a promising context in which to press
such arguments for several reasons.
First, the American public has bonded with the fetus. Through sus-
tained and often brilliant (if at times unprincipled) techniques, 153 the
right-to-life movement has convinced a significant portion of the Ameri-
can public that the fetus is a child. This phenomenon is now a fact of
life. It means that, to many Americans, pro-choice arguments based on
the theme that women are entitled to autonomy and self-possession ap-
pear to pit women's claims for self-possession against the sanctity of life
itself. This is hardly an auspicious context in which to press for core
feminist goals.
Second, the abortion debate is an unpromising context in which to
challenge the norm of selfless motherhood because of its linkage of
women's equality with fears of sexual irresponsibility. As Rosalind Pet-
chesky has argued persuasively, the fear of female sexuality unleashed
from the constraints of the patriarchal family is a strong theme in the
right-to-life movement.1 54
edge not an objective picture of outside world); Joan Williams, Virtue and Oppression, NO-
MOS XXXIII: Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy
(forthcoming) (discussing rhetorics that persuade) [hereinafter, Williams, Virtue and Oppres-
sion]. This perspective is particularly apt in the abortion context, where the American public's
notoriously inconsistent answers to questions about abortion highlight the importance of rhet-
oric in channeling people's reaction to aborting women. See Donald Granberg and Beth Well-
man Granberg, Abortion Attitudes, 1965-1970: Trends and Determinants, 12 Fain. Plan.
Persp. 250, 251 (1980) ("Answers to survey questions are notoriously sensitive to the wording
of the questions.").
151 For a powerfully argued defense of privacy/autonomy in the abortion context, see L.
McClain, supra note 136.
152 See R. Petchesky, supra note 70, at 3-8.
153 See Petchesky, supra note 102, at 267 (documenting inaccuracies in film The Silent
Scream).
154 These fears focus in particular on teenage sexuality. See R. Petchesky, supra note 70, at
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A less noted dynamic is the process by which claims for women's
equality, particularly in contexts involving sexuality, trigger fears of
chaos, filth, and defilement. A recent study of the ERA ratification de-
bate noted how some women perceive the disruption of gender verities as
a threat to the very meaning of their lives.' 55 The study, by Donald G.
Mathews and Jane S. De Hart, reports that women who opposed the
ERA were self-identified "family-oriented women" who felt that the
ERA endangered and devalued the gendered norms upon which they had
built their identities and their lives.' 56 One such woman explained her
position:
He works for me, takes care of me and our three children,
doesn't make me do things that are hard for me (drive in town),
loves me and doesn't smoke, drink, gamble, run around or do
anything that would upset me. I do what he tells me to do. I
like this arrangement, it's the only way I know how to live.157
This analysis both explains that anti-feminists are rational actors moti-
vated by what they perceive as their own self-interest 58 and identifies the
deeper dynamics at work.
The ERA seemed to some women a mechanism to subvert behavior
that expressed the very sources of their selfhood.1 59 One mother wrote
Sam Ervin, a key ERA opponent, after the ERA passed the Senate:
Today I am ashamed and terrified at what the future holds for
my three little girls. Will my shy, sweet Tommy be drafted in
six years? So modest I can't even see her undress. Oh God!...
I just can't stand it. I can't bear it. 160
To deny the relevance of sex to this mother, noted Mathews and De
Hart, "was to deny life and hope. 'Sex' meant the intimate privacy of shy
little girls and equality meant ravaging them, stripping away the protec-
tion of innocence and thrusting them into battle."16' Just as the ERA
263 ("More than anything else, the subject that excites 'prolifers' is premarital sex among
teenagers."); see also id. at 205-38 (discussing abortion and teenagers); id. at 262-85 (opposi-
tion to abortion reflects fears surrounding sexuality).
155 See Donald G. Mathews & Jane S. De Hart, Sex, Gender and the Politics of ERA (1990)
(analyzing ratification process of ERA to explain conflict among participants and its psycho-
logical ramifications).
156 See id. at 155-60 (discussing fears of some family-oriented women who believed ERA
represented "total assault on the role of American women as wife and mother").
157 Id. at 160 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
158 See English, supra note 86, at 16.
159 See D. Mathews & J. De Hart, supra note 155, at 158. Some anti-ERA women believed
that feminists were "trying to create new selves under the mistaken belief that they could
achieve goals that would fulfill them in ways impossible through the bearing and raising of
children." Id.
160 Id. at 162.
161 Id. at 162-63.
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would destroy the mature life of the homemaker, it also would destroy
the innocence of little girls. It would leave women open to the rawness of
male power even in their most private moments in the bathroom: they
would be opened up, quite literally, to rape and violation. 162 Another
letter read:
I am enclosing a petition against ERA. Please vote against this
terrible law. It is the most immoral mess I ever heard of to be
called a law. It is fflthy! 163
The Mathews and De Hart study shows how gender equality awak-
ens fears of defilement even in a context that involved no explicit sexual
component. When the issue is abortion, of course, the fears associated
with unregulated sexuality emerge in full force. Many ERA opponents
explicitly linked abortion with the ERA, viewing both as endorsing he-
donistic sex outside the bounds of family responsibility. One woman ex-
plained in 1977:
I've sat here at home and I've read the magazines, and read the
newspaper, and I've watched the television news, and I never
did anything .... And all of a sudden, this was it. I could just
see ERA was going to deepen the mire, to do much more if I
didn't stop it.... There's a freedom and permissiveness that I
think is wrong. But these young people who are living together,
having abortions, wandering aimlessly without purpose, some-
day they will have to answer. There are no boundaries .... 164
Is this the pursuit of self-interest deteriorated into hedonism?1 65
Perhaps the connection is not precise, but the deeper message concerning
the dangers of the abortion debate is clear: what feminists associate with
equality, particularly in contexts linked to sexuality, others associate
with defilement and the descent of life into tawdry meaninglessness. The
abiding power of gender, in part, rests with the ability to link traditional
gender roles with the orderliness of the universe, so that equality (to
some) threatens the universe with chaos.' 66
The American public's sympathy for the fetus and the fears of
chaos, filth and sexuality that blanket the abortion debate, all suggest it is
162 See id. at 164-67 (discussing some women's assumption that ERA would repeal all laws
relating to women, including those that protected women. Antifeminists said "You mean to
make us like you, that is, like men. You have defiled us!").
163 Id. at 166.
164 Id. at 159-60.
165 See R. Petchesky, supra note 70, at 264 (in right-to-life view, women who get abortions
are "the ultimate hedonists, the paradigm of 'selfishness' ").
166 See D. Mathews & J. De Hart, supra note 155, at 160 (documenting fear of antifeminist
women); see also id. at 159 (abortion represents values that are "linked with uncontrolled
sexuality .. symbolic of a society on the verge of disintegration").
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not a fruitful context in which to press women's claims for autonomy and
self-possession. The abortion controversy is, however, here to stay.
Moreover, access to abortion is now severely threatened. The question
remains whether feminists can reframe their rhetoric to calm the fears
the debate awakens. The remainder of this section reassesses pro-choice
rhetoric from this perspective.
2. Choice, Autonomy, and Caring
The manifold fears at work in the abortion debate suggest that pro-
choice advocates need to supplement their message with reassurance. On
the issues of sexuality and gender equality feminists can offer little. Obvi-
ously, we are not going to disclaim the demand for equality with men.
Moreover, since eighty-two percent of all abortions are performed on di-
vorced or single women, 167 feminists cannot claim that abortion is not
linked with sex outside of marriage. Feminists, however, can seek to
control the gender eddies that swirl around the rhetoric of choice. By
doing so, they can hope to reassure many Americans apprehensive about
abortion.
One way to avoid the fear aroused by the rhetoric of choice is to
abandon the rhetoric altogether. This seems undesirable for two reasons.
First, the anti-government spin of the "who decides" formulation is very
persuasive. Two-thirds of Americans agree that even in cases where I
might think abortion is the wrong thing to do, the government has no
business preventing a woman from having an abortion.1 68 The liberta-
rian spin of this question, which focuses on the undesirability of govern-
mental instrusion in the sex and family lives of its citizens, subtly
divorces abortion and equality for women, instead creating an individual-
versus-government dynamic.
This libertarian strain of choice rhetoric, however, should be distin-
guished from the use of women's choice as a vehicle to preserve their self-
possession and autonomy. The strong appeal of the anti-government, lib-
ertarian theme does not imply to all its supporters that women should be
able to abort for reasons of autonomy and self-development. As noted
above, most Americans do not believe abortions should be legal where
the woman's motivation is career success, and many do not endorse abor-
tions to allow completion of schooling or for economic need. The ques-
tion is how to reframe abortion rhetoric to persuade as many of these
people as possible.
Let me state clearly the audiences I seek to reach. Many right-to-
167 David E. Anderson, Abortion Rate Declined in the '80s But Rose Among Young,
Blacks, United Press Int'l, Wash. News, Apr. 25, 1991.
169 Apple, supra note 138, at A18.
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life activists never will be persuaded of the legitimacy of access to abor-
tion: Luker documents that many have profound religious and other
commitments that make abortion unthinkable; 169 Mathews and De
Hart's analysis reinforces the point. Yet polling data suggests that many
Americans are confused about abortion and apprehensive about govern-
ment's role, even while they also are apprehensive about women who
abort for cavalier or "selfish" reasons. This "ambivalent" majority is one
major target for pro-choice abortion rhetoric.170
Another (overlapping) audience is aborting women themselves.
Thirty percent of all American pregnancies end in abortion, and twenty-
one percent of American women have had abortions. 171 My sense is that
current pro-choice rhetoric lets down many of these women. Said one
pro-choice feminist:
I was completely unprepared for my reaction to my abortion. It
was presented to me as a clinical process, so I was unprepared
for the emotional sense of loss I felt. That was a complete
surprise. 
172
Younger pregnant women are a key audience. In a recent public
forum on abortion, one woman spoke movingly about counselling her
pregnant daugher about abortion. Her daughter would not consider
abortion, she said, until she was convinced that it was a moral choice.
Whenever women confront the tragic dimension of abortion, 173 current
pro-choice rhetoric does not provide what they need: vivid imagery of
abortion as a moral choice. 174 The pro-choice movement needs to work
harder to represent aborting women as moral actors making hard choices
169 See K. Luker, supra note 80, at 186-91, 196-97.
170 See Dionne, supra note 138, at A18; see also E.J. Dionne, Jr., Abortion's Two Sides
Crowd the Center, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1989, at A23 (much of American public thinks both
sides of abortion debate too extreme).
171 See Torres & Forest, supra note 2, at 169; Stanley K. Henshaw et al., Characteristics of
U.S. Women Having Abortions, 1987, 23 Fain. Plan. Persp. 75, 77 (1991).
172 See note 1 supra.
173 Unlike some thoughtful feminists, I am less troubled by the frightened sixteen-year-old
who aborts numbly-or even cavalierly-because she senses a choice between her future and
that of her fetus, and I have no desire to insist that every aborting woman confront the tragic
dimensions of the decision to end fetal life. My instinct is that few women remain unreflective
about their abortions throughout their entire lives. Right-to-life literature suggests that many
women confront the pain and the tragedy of their abortions years later, when they find them-
selves infertile, or pregnant, or otherwise involved in the drama of fetal life.
174 Cf. Mensch & Freeman, supra note 66, at 1120-1131 (indicating that pro-life view, but
not pro-choice view, is defended as moral position; discussing morality in religious terms);
West, supra note 136, at 81-85 (defending morality of pro-choice position in language of re-
sponsibility as opposed to rights). West's intriguing suggestion that abortion rights can be
defended in terms of responsibility runs the risk of reinforcing the societal tendency to allocate
rights to men and responsibilities to women.
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in no-win situations. 175 If we cede this argument to the other side, we
leave to them the idealism of the young.
This approach not only makes for persuasive rhetoric; it may well
provide a more accurate reflection of most women's abortion decisions.
My sense is that, in the context of most women's lives, the decision to
abort is made thoughtfully, carefully, with quiet sorrow and moral cour-
age. 176 Moreover, Carol Gilligan's study suggests that women often jus-
tify their abortion decision to themselves on the grounds that it reflects
selfless dedication to the fulfillment of responsibilities to their children
and spouses, and not on the grounds that no fetus will stand in the way
of their self-development. 177
The need to justify what is right on grounds of gender-allocated self-
lessness need not be dignified as "women's voice" in order to recognize
that women under stress require reassurance that they are not aban-
doning their own ideals, rather than a sermon on the need to revolt
against gender proprieties. Moreover, the rhetoric of selflessness con-
tains a kernel of truth: an adult ethic of self-interest is fundamentally
irresponsible in both mothers and others. At best, mothers' use of the
rhetoric of selflessness signals their rejection of the ideology that en-
shrines self-interest as the proper motivation for adults. 178
One doubts that all these messages can be conveyed simultaneously
in pro-choice abortion rhetoric. Nonetheless, the considerations high-
light a need to be wary of autonomy rhetoric in the abortion context and
175 This process has begun. See Carole Joffee, The Moral Vision of the Pro-Choice Move-
ment: A Response to Ruth Anna Putnam, 4 Tikkun 82 (Sept./Oct. 1989) (arguing abortion
involves morality decision); West, supra note 136, at 81 (defending "moral quality of most
abortion decisions"); Peter Steinfels, Lutherans Vote Abortion Stance, Seeking New Language
in Debate, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1991, at A20 (arguing abortion can be moral choice). A
number of thoughtful feminists have suggested trying to communicate the texture of women's
lives in which abortions seem the only choice. See, e.g., K. McDonnell, supra note 149, at 68-
80. Notable in this context are the forceful and moving "voices briefs" submitted by women's
groups in recent abortion cases. See Brief for the Amici Curiae Women Who Have Had Abor-
tions and Friends of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605) [hereinafter Webster Brief]; Lynn Paltrow and Lynn
Miller, Amicus Brief: Richard Thornburg v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists, 9 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 3 (1986); see also Sarah Bums, Notes From the Field: A Reply
to Professor Colker, 13 Harv. Women's L.J. 189, 197 (1990) (discussing three "women's
voices" briefs). These forceful and moving briefs represent a dramatic widening of pro-choice
rhetoric. The text attempts to analyze what might be the most persuasive themes to develop
through narratives.
176 See National Abortion Rights Action League, The Voices of Women (1989) [hereinafter
Voices].
177 See C. Gilligan, supra note 27, at 76-79, 86-87.
178 This is the junction of feminism and what is often called communitarianism. For exam-
ples of communitarianism, see, e.g., Habits, supra note 14; William A. Galston, Liberal Pur-
poses: Goods, Virtues and Diversity in the Liberal State (1971); Christopher Lasch, The True
and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics (1991); A. Maclntyre, supra note 71.
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the need for a sustained effort by pro-choice forces to control the cultural
imagery of why women abort. Pro-choice rhetoric could break the tradi-
tional linkage of the libertarian and autonomy arguments, and instead
seek to link libertarian arguments with reassuring messages that pro-
choice forces, and aborting mothers, share abortion opponents' appre-
hensions about society's materialism and its canonization of self-interest.
To accomplish this, pro-choice forces need to reassert control of the sin-
gle most crucial subtext of the abortion debate: the narratives of aborting
women.
Up to now, the imagery of why women abort largely has been con-
trolled by right-to-life advocates, who have painted images of "selfish"
women pursuing "convenience" abortions. Pro-choice advocates' con-
viction that women should not have to justify their abortion decisions to
anyone has made them reluctant to enter discussions about abortion as a
moral decision.17 9 One need not abandon a no-restrictions position on
abortion to seek to communicate that position with reassuring images of
abortion as a moral choice. Indeed, this strategy merely seeks to commu-
nicate confidence in women's responsibility as moral decisionmakers.
The subtext of pro-choice stories needs to be that pro-choice forces
share with their opponents a reverence for human life. That is why, in
some cases, pro-choice advocates respect the decision to abort. An ex-
ample of this strategy might use the slogan "Choice: because we care
about the children we have," 180 or "Abortion: sometimes it's the loving
choice,"181 linked with stories designed to paint an image of aborting
women as mothers in pain. Pro-choice forces have made some steps in
this direction. One example is the slogan "Pro-child, pro-family, pro-
choice." But it is not always clear that pro-choice advocates fully under-
stand the dynamics at work.182
One way of reinforcing the symbolic link between access to abortion
and caring motherhood would be to have abortion providers also offer
prenatal services.' 83 But the most direct way to regain control of the
179 See, e.g., text accompanying note 83 supra.
180 My thanks to Judy Rosman, University of Virginia Law School, Class of 1994, for this
suggestion.
181 For reference to this theme in a "voices brief," see Paltrow & Miller, supra note 175, at
17 n.8, 22.
182 For example, shortly before Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, a moving piece in
the New York Times described a mother whose husband left her pregnant. The only way she
could support her child was with a job that would be precluded if she carried the second
pregnancy to term. So she aborted... and we find out she is Mary Travers, of Peter, Paul and
Mary. Mary Travers, My Abortion, Then and Now, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1980, at A23.
Good beginning, bad end. This story is well-designed to confirm pro-life fears of women abort-
ing in favor of vaulting ambition. Again, the underlying messages should be reassuring ones of
motherhood revered, not rejected in favor of career.
183 This arrangement also would help diffuse the common right-to-life argument that abor-
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subtext of the abortion debate is to contest the right-to-life imagery of
selfish women seeking convenience abortions. An obvious story that
might demonstrate how domesticity sometimes drives the abortion deci-
sion would depict a woman who simultaneously loses her husband, finds
out that she is pregnant, and realizes that she must go to work to support
her existing children.184 In that context, it is easy to communicate the
message that many women who abort are mothers who abort out of a
desire to be good mothers. The same message could be conveyed by a
narrative of a mother who aborts to meet the needs of a disabled child,1 85
a story that would address directly the claim that pro-choice advocates
devalue the lives of the disabled. These types of narratives convey the
message that abortions result in part from society's refusal to help
mothers in need. That message may well be heard better when linked
with an argument that society must respect mothers' decisions to abort
given the privatization of so many costs onto individual women.186
Some readers have responded with shock at the suggested use of the
imagery of domesticity. While domesticity in the context of work/family
conflict redounds to the detriment of women, 187 the imagery of domestic-
ity is less perilous in the abortion context for several reasons. First, the
core pro-choice goal is to defend an area of freedom, rather than to chal-
lenge the constraints within which "choice" occurs. Second, the lan-
guage of domesticity is the chief rhetoric of cultural authority in which to
assert claims on behalf of children. It can be used fruitfully in the abor-
tion context because a central message of pro-choice rhetoric should be
that-the claims of right-to-life advocates notwithstanding-both sides
value nurtured children. Of course, the language of nurture is processed
as gendered language: the statement that adults should nurture is
processed as the claim that mothers should nurture. But again, abortion
is not the place to challenge domesticity's gendered allocation of selfless-
ness. The core pro-choice message should be that both defenders and
opponents of abortion seek conditions of effective nurture. They just dis-
agree about which position on abortion best achieves that goal.
A pro-choice position that focuses on children's entitlement to nur-
ture offers a return to radical feminists' original linking of abortion rights
to larger issues of reproductive freedom and equity. 188 In St. Louis, pro-
tion providers are just "in it for the money."
184 See, e.g., Voices, supra note 176, at 14. The National Abortion Rights Action League's
moving pamphlet, The Voices of Women, has a wealth of stories that support the imagery of
women choosing abortion to protect existing and future children.
185 Id. at 26-28.
186 See text accompanying notes 203-77 infra.
187 See Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 797, 813-21 (1989).
188 See text accompanying notes 82-86 supra.
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choice activists (including the directors of clinics) have joined right-to-
life activists to explore the possibility of working together on issues con-
cerning reproductive health. 18 9 "We were convinced that women were
being chewed up by the pro-life, pro-choice debate," said one member of
this "common ground" movement. 19° "It was shockingly easy to iden-
tify issues we agree on," said another, "like the need for aid to pregnant
women who are addicted to drugs, the need for better prenatal care, and
the need to reduce unwanted pregnancy. Neither side wants women to
need abortions because they don't have the money to raise a child." 191
Faye Ginsburg reports a similar detente in her small North Dakota town
between activists on both sides of the abortion issue.' 92 The minutes of
their meeting revealed:
Some very important common ground. We wished that women
would not be faced with pregnancies that they couldn't afford,
that at times they weren't ready for, by people they didn't love,
or for any of the many reasons women have abortions. 193
They resolved to direct their energies to reducing "as much as possible"
the need for abortion.
The National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) used a
similar approach in an advertising campaign. A New York Times adver-
tisement noted:
to us, being pro-choice means having real choices. It means
working to improve our nation's reproductive health care poli-
cies. It means working to reduce the need for abortion... bet-
ter sex education, more effective birth control, improved
methods of contraception and better pre- and post-natal care. 194
189 See Tamar Lewin, In Bitter Abortion Debate, Opponents Learn to Reach for Common
Ground, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1992, at 10. For a summary of other recent developments, see
Ellen Goodman, Concerns Across the Abortion Chasm, Wash. Post, May 30, 1992, at A21.
190 Lewin, supra note 189.
191 Id. For examples of right-to-life feminists who link their opposition to abortion to the
need for increased support for parental leave, child-care allowances, day care provisions,
health care, increased housing and educational and employment opportunities, see Sidney Cal-
lahan, A Moral Obligation, Sojourners, Nov. 1989, at 18 (advocating restrictions on abortion
be met with new aid and alternatives, like parental leave, nutritional programs, counseling,
child-care centers, educational and employment opportunities); Kathleen Hayes, Fully Pro-
Life, Sojourners, Nov. 1989, at 22 (discussing need to provide adequate support for those not
aborting).
192 Members of the local Women's Political Caucus organized a dialogue ("Pro-Dialogue")
between right-to-life and pro-choice activists in 1984 to try to create a compromise position on
abortion for the state Demoractic platform. See F. Ginsberg, supra note 80, at 223-24.
193 Id. at 224 (emphasis in original).
194 America: Our Goal Should Be to Make Abortion Less Necessary-Not More Danger-
ous, Not More Difficult, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1991, at A12. Note that the advertisement con-
tains language similar to traditional abortion rights rhetoric. Its overall focus clearly is on
providing a "full range of reproductive health options," rather than on "reduc[ing] the need
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A positive step, this advertisement attempts detente by reclaiming the
approach of the radical feminists: 195 placing abortion in the larger con-
text of women's reproductive lives. Instead of using the radical language
of oppression, however, this strategy could project a very different image:
one of women whose understandable desire to have their babies is
thwarted by society's failure to invest in mothers and children.
In short, this strategy could use the rhetoric of domesticity, of
women yearning to be good mothers, to mobilize domesticity's embedded
critique against social and governmental decisions to invest in men and
missiles rather than in children. While this strategy holds some poten-
tial, it is likely that Americans' reluctance to commit public resources to
families will win out. After all, our society has the highest infant mortal-
ity rate in the industrialized world;196 a quarter of American children, 197
and fifty percent of African-American children, 198 live in poverty. Can
fetuses accomplish what live children cannot, in terms of making Ameri-
cans recognize the implications of these statistics? Perhaps not. But, at
the very least, a pro-choice message undergirded with reassuring images
of aborting women would contest the right-to-life movement's current
monopoly on the power of the rhetoric of domesticity. In my view, the
pro-choice movement should take a hint from Gilligan's abortion study
and help women justify access to abortion-for themselves and others-
on the only (selfless) grounds to which many Americans feel women are
truly entitled.
III
A MOTHER'S CHOICE19 9
As most people understand it, the mommy track implies
for abortion." Id.
195 NARAL itself rejected this approach in the 1970s. See R. Petchesky, supra note 70, at
130-31 (contrasting radical feminists' advocacy of "concrete access to abortion for all women"
and practical need for "substantive changes in the quality and conditions of reproductive
health care," with NARAL's advocacy of legal "right to choose" and exclusion of state from
abortion decisions altogether).
196 Geoffrey Cowley, Children in Peril, Newsweek, Special Issue, Summer 1991, at 18.
197 Ruth Sidel, Women and Children Last 3 (1986) (poverty rate for children 24% in 1984).
198 See Delores Kong, Political Will Crucial to Saving Babies' Lives, Boston Globe, Sept.
13, 1990, at 1 (describing how United States ranks last among all industrialized nations con-
cerning infant mortality rate in 1988 and comparing our health care system with that of other
nations). Critics blame this poverty rate and the expected increase in the infant mortality rate
on the failure to invest in prenatal care and broader access to health insurance and family
services. Id. In New York City, approximately 40% of all children are raised in poverty. See
David R. Francis, World's Children Need Peace Dividend, Christian Sci. Monitor, May 18,
1990, at 7 (discussing failure of United States to heed direct relationship between improve-
ments in child health and education and economic gain).
199 See Barbara Kantrowitz, A Mother's Choice, Newsweek, Mar. 31, 1986, at 46
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that mothers are sacrificing their careers-being shifted into less
important jobs-because they're raising children. There are
three things wrong with this notion. The first is that it involves
"sacrifice." The second is that only mothers are affected. And
the third is that decisions made in the early years of parenthood
permanently doom careers.
My wife fits the stereotype of someone on the mommy
track. Since our daughter's birth four years ago, she's been in
and out of part-time jobs. She now has a job three days a week.
But she doesn't think she's made a "sacrifice." My wife got off
whatever "track" she was on because she wanted to. When my
daughter arrived, I didn't suddenly lose all ambition. But I
started getting home earlier at night, working less on weekends
and deferring (forever?) some bigger and enticing writing
projects....
Before I'm labeled a complete hypocrite, let me acknowl-
edge the obvious; my wife has had to change more than I have.
Despite my many admirable exertions (making the bed, doing
the dishes, helping with the children at night), she still has most
of the responsibility for the children. When not being thor-
oughly self-centered, I worry that she'll feel frustrated by the
strains between home and job. But she doesn't worry-and
neither do I-that once she returns to a full-time paid job, she'll
have trouble finding something rewarding and challenging.2°°
Part II argued that the abortion context is the wrong place to chal-
lenge the norm of selflessness for mothers. Part III argues that the
"working mother" debate is the right place. Whereas in the abortion
context challenging the norm of selfless motherhood pits women against
the sanctity of life itself, in the context of work/family conflict such a
challenge can be framed in two more promising ways: as a matter of
equity between men and women and as a matter of protecting society's
investment in children.
The inequity of the current distribution of work and family responsi-
bilities is best dramatized by the phenomenon of the second shift: mar-
ried women work dramatically longer hours than do their husbands
because of their double burden of domestic and paid work.201 The sec-
ond shift is only one of the many ways in which the current gendered
structure of wage labor disempowers women. The current system defines
childrearing and the accepted paths of adult advancement as inconsis-
(describing demands of motherhood and career on working women).
200 Robert J. Samuelson, The Daddy Track, Wash. Post, Mar. 29, 1989, at A25.
201 See Arlie Hochschild, The Second Shift 3-4 (1989).
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tent; it then privatizes the consequent costs of childrearing onto women.
The system not only leaves most women with different-and much less
attractive-options than men have; it also links children to the fate of
their marginalized mothers, leaving both groups disproportionately
impoverished.202
Feminists need to challenge this gendered system by contesting the
marginalization of caregivers and reopening the issues of what care chil-
dren need and the extent to which parental caregiving is delegable.
While Part II sought to adjust choice rhetoric in the context of the abor-
tion debate, this Part seeks to alienate women from that rhetoric. In part
this entails gathering sociological data to document how social patterns
reflect a gender system that privileges men. My sense, though, is that
many women acknowledge these data even while they continue to use the
rhetoric of choice in their own lives. Choice rhetoric is so deeply reflex-
ive that we need narratives to loosen its grip. Therefore, after an intro-
duction to the rhetoric of choice in the "working mothers" debate and a
discussion of the relationship of choice to false consciousness, this section
uses narratives to examine several related issues: the power dynamics
underlying "choice," how choice rhetoric pits women against each other,
and why women formulate their sacrifices in choice terminology.
A. Selfless Mothers and Ideal Workers: Work/Family Conflict
Reflects a System of Gender Privilege
In the work/family context, the rhetoric of choice masks a gender
system that defines childrearing and the accepted avenues of adult ad-
vancement as inconsistent and then allocates the resulting costs of child-
rearing to mothers.20 3 At the core of the system is a notion of an ideal
202 See text accompanying notes 252-65 infra.
203 The rich law review literature on the work/family conflict includes Kathryn Abrams,
Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1183
(1989) (examining both sexual harrassment and work/family conflict); Nancy E. Dowd, Work
and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. 431 (1990) [hereinafter Dowd,
Restructuring the Workplace] (presenting picture of contemporary families, workforce, and
workplace; analyzing work/family issues; and envisioning transformed workplace); Nancy E.
Dowd, Envisioning Work and Family: A Critical Perspective on International Models, 26
Harv. J. on Legis. 311 (1989) (critical look at work/family policies of Sweden and France)
[hereinafter Dowd, Envisioning Work and Family]); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The
Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Work-
place, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 79 (1989) [hereinafter Dowd, Gender Paradox] (arguing
that while gender and women are inseparable from discrimination analysis, we must, paradoxi-
cally, go beyond gender discussion in order to resolve work/family issues); Lucinda M. Finley,
Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86
Colum. L. Rev. 1118 (1986) (using special treatment/equal treatment to critique usefulness of
equality analysis as device for challenging social and economic subordination of women); Mary
Joe Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59
B.U. L. Rev. 55 (1979) (arguing that while some labor market barriers may be challenged
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worker without primary responsibility for children: a worker absent
from home a minimum of nine hours a day, five or six days a week, often
with overtime at short notice and at the employer's discretion.2°4 Under-
lying the expectations for the "ideal" worker is the rarely challenged as-
sumption that the accepted avenues of adult power and responsibility
inevitably are incompatible with caregiving. Of course they are not:
their incompatibility results from a societal choice to marginalize
caregivers. This becomes a gender issue because the marginalized
caregivers-virtually without exception-are women. A mother's only
real choice is to provide the flow of services herself or to delegate "her"
responsibilities to other marginalized women.20 5
This gender system of ideal-worker fathers and marginalized women
creates a systematic power differential between men and women that
manifests itself in different ways. 20 6 For women who insist on perform-
ing as ideal workers, the price is often childlessness. The typical corpo-
rate woman is married and childless: roughly sixty-five percent of
managerial women have no children by the age of forty.207 Women law-
yers also are much more likely to be childless than male lawyers. 208 "I
have no doubt that had I had the wonderful husband and two adorable
children I thought I wanted years ago, I would not be a partner today,"
said one.20 9 Sociological studies show that women with firm career com-
mitments often sacrifice childrearing with ambivalent feelings of loss and
successfully under present law, new legislation rather than litigation is only likely way to
achieve dramatic labor market restructuring necessary to eliminate present disparity between
men and women in workforce); Rhode, Occupational Inequality, supra note 20; Deborah L.
Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 Yale L.
J. 1731 (1991) [hereinafter Rhode, No-Problem Problem] (exploring denial, discounting, or
deflecting gender inequity notions within our present legal norms and readdressing feminist
challenge); see also Williams, supra note 187, at 822-45.
204 Bureau of Census reports show that in the most recent survey available, the average one-
way commute to work was 20.5 minutes. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census
Supp. to Annual Housing Survey for the United States in 1985, Current Housing Rep. H-151-
85-1, at 417. Women tend to work closer to home travelling an average distance of 8.8 miles to
men's 12.1. Conversation of author with Gloria Swieczkowski, Journey-To-Work and Migra-
tion Statistics Branch, Population Division, U.S. Bureau of the Census, April 17, 1992.
205 See text accompanying note 264 infra.
206 For a discussion of how the marginalization of caregivers affects women's "choice" in
favor of domesticity, see Susan M. Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family 142-46 (1989).
207 Felice N. Schwartz, Management Women and the New Facts of Life, Harv. Bus. Rev.,
Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 65, 69. Another survey reported that 95% of male corporate leaders and
39% of women at equivalent levels of management have children. See Felice M. Schwartz,
Breaking with Tradition 106 (1992) [hereinafter F. Schwartz, Breaking With'Tradition].
208 See American Bar Association, Commission on Women in the Profession, Lawyers and
Balanced Lives 4 (1990) [hereinafter ABA Study].
209 Ruth Sidel, On Her Own 174 (1990) (quoting Jill Abramson, For Women Lawyers, An
Uphill Struggle, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1988, (Magazine), at 36-37, 73-75).
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sadness.210 Their "choice" to remain childless reflects their knowledge
that marriage generally hurts women's careers. 211 In sharp contrast,
men need not remain childless to protect their ability to perform as ideal
workers. In fact, marriage enhances their ability to do so, as is evidenced
by the fact that ambitious young men are pressured to marry,212 that
ninety-five percent of men in management do marry,213 and that mar-
riage generally enhances men's careers. 214 That ambitious women often
are forced to choose between work and family, while ambitious men are
not, is a dramatic illustration that men and women face profoundly dif-
ferent "choices."
If women who insist on careers often give up children, mothers pay
the price of work/family conflict in different coin. The average Ameri-
can mother spends seventeen years caring for her children and eighteen
years caring for elderly parents-both her own and her husband's.2 5
She spends eleven and one-half years of her working life on caregiving;
the average man spends six months.216 Many caregivers pay a steep price
in terms of their ability to support themselves and their children. One
study found that eleven percent of caregivers quit or were fired from their
outside jobs because of their caregiving responsibilities. 21 7 Another study
of the impact of elder care on women's careers found, in addition to the
10% of those involved who quit, 20% had to rearrange work schedules,
21% reduced hours worked, and 19% took time off without pay.218
210 See, e.g., Kathleen Gerson, Hard Choices: How Women Decide About Work, Career,
and Motherhood 133, 149, 153-57 (1985).
211 Id. at 3; see also Dowd, Restructuring the Workplace, supra note 203, at 443-44 ("Mar-
riage decreases the likelihood that women are in the workforce and weakens their labor market
position.").
212 Keith Bradsher, Young Men Pressed to Wed For Success, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1989, at
C1.
213 Liz Sly, Firms Look for Ways to Keep Moms on the Job, Chi. Trib., Mar. 19, 1989, at 1.
214 See Lenore Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution 36 (1985); Bradsher, supra note 212, at
I.
215 See Marilyn Gardner, Derailed on the "Daughter Track," Christian Sci. Monitor, June
20, 1989, at 14. For further analysis that extends caregiving beyond childcare, see Nadine
Taub, From Parental Leaves to Nurturing Leaves, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 381, 381-
84 (1984-85) (addressing need for comprehensive, nationally-funded system of "compassion-
ate" work leave to support needed caregiving services). Although this Article focuses primar-
ily on child-care, the conjunction of child- and elder-care exacerbates the disunity between
women's responsibilities and ideal worker status. For a general survey of the "daughter
track," see Melinda Beck, Trading Places, Newsweek, July 16, 1990, at 48.
216 See Tamar Lewin, Aging Parents: Women's Burden Grows, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1989,
at Al, B12; see also Cindy Skrzycki, Family Blessings, and Burden; Employees Struggle to
Balance Work With Care of Aging Relatives as Well as Children, Wash. Post, Dec. 24, 1989,
at H1 (75% of people caring for elderly are women).
217 See Gardner, supra note 215, at 14 (quoting survey by "9 to 5," a national organization
of office workers).
218 See Women's Bureau, Facts on U.S. Working Women, Fact Sheet No. 86-4 (1986),
quoted in Dowd, Envisioning Work and Family, supra note 203, at 315.
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These statistics do not even include the impact of children on women's
employment.219 The societal norm that women perform the large bulk of
child and elder care contributes substantially to women's economic
marginalization.220
This inequitable allocation of caregiving responsibilities means that
employed women shoulder disproportionate burdens once wage and do-
mestic labor are combined. Wives who work outside the home still do
the majority of work inside it.221 As a result, employed wives sleep
less, 222 enjoy less leisure,223 and work much longer hours than their hus-
bands. 224 One study found that wives do seventy-nine percent of the
housework. 225 "Under optimal conditions," concluded another, em-
ployed wives do five times the domestic work their spouses do.226 A
third concluded that husbands of employed wives barely contribute
enough domestic labor to make up for the additional work their presence
in the household creates.227 The end result is that employed wives work
an average of 144% of the total time of a traditional homemaker.228
Wives thus pay a steep price for their attempt to combine employ-
ment with their "second shift" of domestic work: half of all employed
mothers reported "a lot" or "extreme" stress.229 Many women ulti-
219 For an example in the professional context, see Margaret M. Poloma et al., Reconsider-
ing the Dual-Career Marriage: A Longitudinal Approach, in Two Paychecks: Life in Dual-
Earner Families 173 (Joan Aldous ed., 1982) [hereinafter Two Paychecks] (married profes-
sional mothers tend to slow or sacrifice career development whereas fathers do not).
220 See text accompanying notes 252-66 infra.
221 See Catharine E. Ross, The Division of Labor at Home, 65 Soc. Forces 816, 830 (1987)
(examining division of labor between husband and wife to find that 76% of wives employed
full-time still do majority of housework).
222 A. Hochschild, supra note 201, at 3, 279, quoting Shelley Coverman, Gender, Domestic
Labor Time, and Wage Inequality, 48 Am. Soc. Rev. 623 (1983). A man is likely to get more
sleep the higher his social class, while a woman is likely to get less sleep the higher her social
class. Id. at 279.
223 Hochschild reports that some studies find a "leisure gap" of from 11 to 19 hours a week
between employed fathers and mothers. See id. at 271-73. Another study reported that hus-
bands watched television one hour longer. See The Use of Time: Daily Activities of Urban
and Suburban Populations in Twelve Countries 668 (Table B)(Alexander Szalai ed., 1972),
cited in id. at 3 (collected cross-national social research studies in twelve countries). Husbands
also spend more time over meals than their wives. See A. Hochschild, supra note 201, at 279.
224 A. Hochschild, supra note 201, at 3 (employed mothers work roughly 15 hours longer
than employed fathers each week).
225 See Donna H. Berardo et al., A Residue of Tradition: Jobs, Careers, and Spouses' Time
in Housework, 49 J. Marriage & Fam. 381, 388 (1987) (discussing statistical study showing
wives contributed 79% of total housework each week.)
226 See Suzanne Model, Housework by Husbands: Determinant and Implications, in Two
Paychecks, supra note 219, at 193-205.
227 See Judith A. Heath & David H. Cicel, Patriarchy, Family Structure, and the Exploita-
tion of Women's Labor, 22 J. Econ. Issues 781, 788 (1988).
228 Id. at 787.
229 See Juliet B. Schor, The Overworked American 11 (1991). Some studies reveal that a
job, especially a high-powered one, may be the least stressful element in a woman's life and, in
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mately refuse to pay the price, particularly when their "double burden"
is combined with sex discrimination,230 including sexual harassment,231
and their relegation to low-paying women's work.232 Statistics reporting
that most mothers work outside the home mask the fact that forty per-
cent of married women with children under six do not 233 and that
roughly one-third of those who do usually work part-time.234 Given that
part-time workers are often paid at lower rates than full-time workers,
and often receive fewer benefits,235 these statistics are a vivid illustration
of the pattern of ideal-worker fathers and marginalized mothers. This
pattern may be reinforced by the increase in fathers' working hours since
1969.236 Thirty percent of fathers with children under fourteen report
working fifty hours or more a week.237 The same percentage report
weekend work at their regular job, while many more work a second job
on weekends. 238
The speed-up among American workers is particularly marked
among professionals, 239 and accompanies the oft-noted disempowerment
fact, enhances her psychological well-being. See Nina Darnton, Women and Stress on Job and
at Home, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1985, at Cl. A 25-year study of college educated women found
that housewives had the lowest self-esteem and considered themselves the least competent at
almost every task, including child care. Susan Faludi, Don't Be Happy-Worryl Wash. Post
(Magazine), Oct. 20, 1991, at W12.
230 For a recent historical study, see Claudia Goldin, Understanding the Gender Gap 83-
118 (1990).
231 For a classic study, see Catharine MacKinnon, The Sexual Harassment of Working
Women (1979).
232 See C. Goldin, supra note 230, at 71-82 (historical study of occupational segregation); R.
Sidel, supra note 209, at 187-88 (documenting both inter- and intra-occupational sex
segregation).
233 See U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1991 Annual Averages (unpub-
lished data); Conversation with John Stinson, BLS Labor Economist, Apr. 15, 1992. As of
1988, about 63% ofnonemployed women were "keeping house." U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, January 1989, Table A-54. African-American mothers traditionally have
had much higher rates of labor force participation than whites. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Bureau of Census, Lifetime Work Experience and Its Effects on Earnings (1984).
234 U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Work Experience of the Population in
1990, Table 1, USDL 91-447, Sept. 11, 1991; Telephone Interview with John Stinson, BLS
Labor Economist, May 26, 1992.
235 See Martha Chamallas, Women and Part-Time Work, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 709, 715-16
(although part-time workers work 46% of hours full-time workers do, they are paid only 28%
of full-time workers' wages); Betty Holcomb, Is the Mommy Track a Trap?, Working Women,
July 1988, at 88 (asserting that even most skilled professionals, when working part-time, aver-
age 78% less an hour than full-time workers; 80% have no pension coverage, 20% have no
health insurance (quoting Kathleen Christensen, associate professor of City University of New
York)).
236 See J. Schor, supra note 229, at 29 (men now work 98 more hours per year than in
1969).
237 See id. at 2.
238 Id.
239 For an anthropologist's studies on the great American speed-up in elite circles, see Con-
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of women in elite work environments. 24° One recent study estimated
that, although women comprise 50 percent of managers at entry-level
positions, thereafter the percentage of women drops precipitously, 24' so
that top levels of management are 95 percent male.242 In the law as well,
stance Perin, The Moral Economy of the Workplace and Careers, Panel on "Political Correct-
ness" and Cultural Studies, Ninth Annual Interdisciplinary Forum of The Western
Humanities Conference, University of California, Berkeley, Oct. 21, 1990 ("It is quite easy to
recruit young professional women, especially right out of college... but retention is a big
problem. More women are leaving jobs than men... Many go to small companies; others
start businesses." (quoting officer of large company)). For a discussion of work/family conflict
among lawyers, see Judith S. Kaye, Women Lawyers in Big Firms: A Study in Progress To-
ward Gender Equality, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 111, 119-22 (1988) (affirming gender imbalance
and inequity among women lawyers while noting some progress in rectifying inequality with
respect to big law firms); Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 Stan. L.
Rev. 1163 (1988) (exploring departure from traditional challenges to professional women-i.e.,
how well women can accommodate demands of male-dominated professions-to question of
how professions may change to accommodate women); Joan Williams, Sameness Feminism
and the Work/Family Conflict, 35 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 347 (1990) (discussing how sameness
feminists and difference feminists view (or fail to view) "choice" rhetoric in context of lawyer/
professional careers); Project, Law Firms and Lawyers with Children: An Empirical Analysis
of Family/Work Conflict, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1209, 1222-24, 1256-59 (1982) [hereinafter Project,
Lawyers with Children] (discussing results of employer and student survey that inquired as to
attitudes and expectations regarding maternity, paternity, and child-care options); Richard
Connelly, Ten Years Later: Class of'81, Tex. Law., Apr. 29, 1991, at S-1 (considering Univer-
sity of Texas class roster showing that most of women lawyers from class of 1981 not on
partnership track). For an interesting survey of work/family conflict in academic life, see
Personal Lives and Professional Careers: The Uneasy Balance, Report of the Women's Com-
mittee of the American Studies Association (1988). My thanks to Regina Morantz-Sanchez
for bringing the study to my attention.
240 See, e.g., Ann M. Morrison et. al., Breaking the Glass Ceiling (1987); R. Sidel, supra
note 209, at 170-79 (documenting glass ceiling in medicine, law, management, and politics).
241 F. Schwartz, Breaking With Tradition, supra note 207, at 170.
242 Id. Felice Schwartz ignited the mommy track debate when she attempted to respond to
this pattern by suggesting that there are two kinds of women-those who are "career-primary"
and those who are "career-and-family" women. See Schwartz, supra note 207, at 65. "Career-
primary" women are young, childless, and willing to put their careers first. She sets guidelines
for identifying these women and separating them from the "career-and-family" types who are
best kept in middle management positions because they are less productive, and "[un]willing to
give their all to the company." Id. at 71. Schwartz's article proved to be highly controversial,
since it appeared to sanction the marginalization of many managerial women. See, e.g., Ste-
phanie Brush, Women Betwixt and Between, Wash. Post, March 26, 1929, at F4; Meredith
Chen, Women at Work: A New Debate Is Born, L.A. Times, Mar. 19, 1989, Part IV, at 3;
Brian Couturier, Coalition Warns Against Supporting Idea with Legislation; 44 Women's
Groups Blast Concept of 'Mommy Tack,' L.A. Times, Mar. 23, 1989, Part IV, at 1; Elizabeth
Ehrlich, Is The Mommy Track A Blessing - Or A Betrayal?, Bus. Week, May 15, 1989, at 98;
Audrey Freedman, Those Costly 'Good Old Boys,' N.Y. Times, July 12, 1989, at A23; Ellen
Goodman, Mommy Track - Or Trough?, Wash. Post, Mar. 18, 1989, at A27; Tamar Lewin,
Mommy Career Track Sets Off Furor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1989, at A18; Carol M. Lewis,
U.S. Business Suffers When Mothers Can't Get Back On the Fast Track, L.A. Times, Apr. 21,
1989, Part IV, at 3; Letters To Editor, Mommy Track's an Idea Whose Time Has Gone, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 2, 1989, § 4, at 30 (six letters to editor responding to Schwartz's article); Judy
Mann, The Demeaning 'Mommy Track,': Separate and Unequal, Wash. Post, Mar. 15, 1989,
at C3; Abigail Trafford, Mommy Track - Right to The Top, Wash. Post, Mar. 19, 1989, at Cl.
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statistics on the relative absence of women at the top of the profession led
one commentator to note the "frightening possibility" that law firms will
evolve into institutions "top-heavy with men and childless women, sup-
ported by a pink-collar ghetto of mommy-lawyers," often with perma-
nent associate status.243 Although 40 percent of law students and 20
percent of lawyers were women as of 1988, only 8 percent of the partners
in the 250 largest law firms are women; the median income of women 10
years out of law school is 40 percent lower than men's.
244
Women's disempowerment in elite work environments reflects both
discrimination 245 and elite men's privileged access to domestic services.
One study reports that most wives of high-income husbands do not have
careers, or even noncareer employment, despite their high levels of edu-
cation.246 This suggests that many elite males tap a flow of domestic
For articles explaining Schwartz's position and responding to her critics, see Beverly Beyette,
A New Career Flap, What's a Mommy Track and Why Are So Many Women Upset About
It?, L.A. Times, Mar. 17, 1989, Part IV, at 1; Marian Christy, Boosting Women - and Paying
the Price, Boston Globe, Sept. 17, 1989, at B15; Ellen Hopkins, Who is Felice Schwartz and
Why is She Saying Those Terrible Things About Us?, Working Women, Oct. 1990, at 117;
Felice N. Schwartz, The 'Mommy Track' Isn't Anti-Woman, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1989, at
A27; Cindy Skrzycki, 'Mommy Track' Author Answers Her Many Critics, Wash. Post, Mar.
19, 1989, at Al; Beverly Beyette, A New Career Flap: What's a Mommy Track and Why Are
So Many Women Upset About It?, L.A. Times, Mar. 17, 1989, Part IV, at 1. The mommy
track debate is a good example of a gender war in which women end up pitted against each
other rather than against the ideal worker template that disempowers all women in different
ways. Schwartz's book is more successful than her article in maintaining the focus on the
corporate world's unacceptable marginalization of managerial women. See F. Schwartz,
Breaking With Tradition, supra note 207, at 125-91.
Articles appear occasionally on the "daddy track," but a close reading of them is neces-
sary. Most fathers do not accept permanent career marginalization. The articles suggest that
men commonly cut back on work responsibilities for a year or so after the birth of their first
child, only to have the wife quit work or cut back on a semi-permanent basis when a second
child is born. See, e.g., Keith H. Hammonds, Taking Baby Steps Toward a Daddy Track, Bus.
Week, Apr. 15, 1991, at 90, 91 ("The news that my wife was expecting a second child...
made it clear we couldn't keep up our balancing act. Within a month my wife had quit her job,
and I was back working full-time.") "Daddy track" men therefore rarely seem to follow those
"mommy track" mothers who accept long-term career marginalization in order to provide
care for the couple's children. See Geneva Overholster, So Where's the Daddy Track?, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 23, 1988, at A26.
243 Mary C. Hickey, The Dilemma of Having it All, Wash. Law., May-June 1986, at 59.
244 Patricia M. Wald, Women in the Law, Trial, Nov. 1988, at 75 (also noting that women
comprise only 6% of law-school deans and 10% of tenured law school professors).
245 For discussion of hostile work cultures in traditionally male jobs, see Vicki Schultz,
Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the
Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising Lack of Interest Argument, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1749,
1832-39 (1990). For an example of discrimination against a qualified woman, see Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (accounting firm discriminated against female
partnership candidate).
246 See Harold Benenson, Women's Occupational and Family Achievement in the U.S.
Class System: A Critique of the Dual-Career Family Analysis, 35 Brit. J. Soc. 19, 28 (1984)
(wives of high-income husbands half as likely to work outside home than wives of median-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 66:1559
HeinOnline -- 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1602 1991
SELFLESS WOMEN
services that reinforces their ability to conform to workaholic norms, a
pattern that places mothers at a severe disadvantage. 247
The open, formal marginalization of mothers from the accepted ave-
nues of adult authority disempowers women in two important ways.
First, marginalized mothers are disempowered within the heterosexual
household. Studies confirm that economic independence correlates with
power inside the household. 24 8 Wives who work tend to have more
power than those who do not;249 husbands' power tends to increase with
their income and occupational prestige.25 0 Husbands' power also is
linked with physical abuse: battered women are less likely to leave their
husbands if they are not employed and feel economically dependent.2 51
The power differential within intact marriages transmutes upon di-
vorce into a dramatic disparity between men's and women's post-divorce
incomes, when the negative economic impact of marriage on women
emerges clearly. Researchers consistently have documented a sharp fall
in mothers' economic position, and a sharp rise in fathers', after di-
vorce. 25 2 Only about half of fathers continue to play any role in support-
income men with (on average) a high school education; even most highly trained wives of
privileged men less likely to be working than were high school educated wives of median-
income husbands). This Article attempts to respond to Benenson's concern that the interests
of elite and other women diverge. Id. at 35. Both groups suffer because of the economic and
social marginalization of caregiving. Compare Ross, supra note 221, at 802 (quoting findings
from study showing that the higher the wife's education, the more likely the husband is to
share housework.).
247 See Poloma et. al., supra note 219, at 173 (married professional mothers tend to sacrifice
career development; fathers do not).
248 See, e.g., Ellen I. Rosen, Bitter Choices: Blue-Collar Women In and Out of Work 96-
101 (1987); Dair L. Gillespie, Who Has the Power? The Marital Struggle, 33 J. Mar. & Farn.
445 (1971) (finding that the greater the husband's income and status, the greater is his deci-
sion-making power in family); Glenna Spitze, Women's Employment and Family Relations:
A Review, 50 J. Mar. & Fam. 595, 601-03 (1988) (employed wives wield more power relative
to their husbands, at least in decisions about money). Rosen points out that outside employ-
ment does not itself necessarily give wives more power within the household, but that wives do
garner more power relative to their husbands as their salaries approach those of their hus-
bands. E. Rosen, supra, at 97 (citing prior studies). This suggests that the emerging pattern of
wives as secondary earners in marginalized jobs leaves wives with the worst of both worlds: in
frustrating jobs, overburdened by the second shift at home, and without significant increase in
authority either at home or at work. See also Polatnick, supra note 30, at 24-25 ("The more a
man earns, the more family power he wields; and the greater the discrepancy between the
status of the husband's and wife's work, the greater the husband's power."). Wives' power
ordinarily declines with the birth of children. Id. at 31. In addition, an inverse relationship
exists between the number of children and the wife's power in relation to her husband. Id.
Wives' power ordinarily is at its lowest point when her children are in preschool. Id. at 32.
249 See Gillespie, supra note 248, at 452. Wives' relative power tends to increase with the
number of years they have worked. Id.
250 Id. at 451-52.
251 See Spitze, supra note 248, at 597.
252 Lenore Weitzman calculated that divorced men's standard of living rises an average of
42% in the first year after divorce, while divorced women's falls 73%. See L. Weitzman, supra
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ing their children after four months of separation from their wives253 and
many marginalized mothers raise their children largely alone.2 54
The system of ideal workers and marginalized mothers links the fate
of women and children, leaving both disproportionately impoverished.
The feminization of poverty has been documented extensively. 255 The
most dramatic statistics concern female-headed families, which are three
times more likely than other families to have incomes below the poverty
line.256 The median income for such families is one-half to one-third of
that of two-parent families.257 Moreover, female-headed families are ten
times more likely to stay poor than are families with no male present.258
The economic marginalization of caregivers links the fate of mothers
and children, leaving children the poorest age group in contemporary
America. 259 Over two-thirds of all children living in female-headed fami-
lies are poor:260 seventy-three percent of children from one-parent fami-
lies will experience poverty at some point during their childhood.261
note 214, at 323. Although Weitzman's figures have been challenged, with the controversy
focusing on the size of the income disparity between divorced husbands and wives, the exist-
ence of the disparity is generally conceded. The Census Bureau followed 20,000 households
for 32 months and reported a 37% income drop for mothers which, when adjusted for the
drop in family size, reflects a 26% loss overall. See Jason DeParle, Child Poverty Twice as
Likely After Families Split, Study Says, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1991, § 1, at 8. Other research-
ers, relying on independent data, find a 30% drop in wives' post-divorce standard of living
while men experience a 10-15% improvement. Greg Duncan & Saul Hoffman, Economic
Consequences of Marital Instability, Horizontal Equity, Uncertainty and Economic Well Be-
ing 467 (M. David and T. Smeedings eds., 1985). For a list of other studies on the economic
impact of divorce on women, see Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C.
L. Rev. 1103, 1104 (1989) ("Virtually all... studies have found that no-fault divorce is finan-
cially devastating for women and the minor children of the households."). For examples of
critiques, see Susan Faludi, Backlash 21-22 (1991); Jed H. Abraham, "The Divorce Revolu-
tion" Revisited: A Counter Revolutionary Critique, 9 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 251 (1989).
253 See Spenser Rich, Children Feel Financial Pinch when Families Split, Wash. Post,
March 7, 1991, at A21 (when parents split, children suffer financially); De Parle, supra note
252, § 1 at 8; see also L. Weitzman, supra note 214, at 262-322.
254 Only one-sixth of children see their fathers as often as once a week in the period rela-
tively soon after divorce; after 10 years, almost two-thirds have no contact at all with their
fathers. See William A. Gaston, When the Bough Breaks: The Costs of Neglecting Our Chil-
dren, New Republic, Dec. 2, 1991, at 6.
255 See Renee Feinberg & Kathleen E. Knox, The Feminization of Poverty in the United
States: A Selected, Annotated Bibliography of the Issues, 1978-1989 (1990); see also Richard
Levy & Richard C. Michel, The Economic Future of American Families 38 (1991) (noting that
female-headed families represent profile of American poverty today).
256 Sara E. Rix, The American Woman 1990-91, at 12 (1990).
257 Id. The median income of female-headed families is about one-third that of two-earner
families and about one-half that of male-headed families where the wife is not employed.
258 Diana M. Pearce, Welfare is Not For Women: Toward a Model of Advocacy to Meet
the Needs of Women in Poverty, 19 Clearinghouse Rev. 412, 413-14 (1985).
259 Id. at 2.
260 S. Rix, supra note 256, at 12.
261 Id. at 5.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 66:1559
HeinOnline -- 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1604 1991
SELFLESS WOMEN
Nearly one-quarter of all children, 262 and one-half of all African-Ameri-
can children are poor.263
The impact of marginalized motherhood on the welfare of children
is also dramatic when we move from childless career women and married
mothers to other groups of women. Child care workers also suffer from
society's devaluation of caregiving, which is reflected in their dramati-
cally low salaries. Surely the devaluation of caregiving hurts not only the
caregivers, who are consigned to low-wage work264 in high-stress, high-
turnover jobs, but also the children. 265
Single mothers are more acutely disadvantaged than any other
group of women by the assumption that the ideal worker will be sup-
ported by a marginalized wife. Not only are single mothers dispropor-
tionately impoverished; often they are caught in impossible positions
because they have no choice but to perform both as ideal workers and as
caregivers. For example:
Milagros Reyes took her baby boy to the hospital for a hernia
operation, but had to rush away a few hours after surgery to get
back to work. Her 6-month-old son, bandaged and scared, was
crying as she left, but she feared that a missed day might get her
fired from her $7.79-an-hour factory job.266
This story dramatizes the steep price children pay for the societal as-
sumption that mothers are supported by an ideal worker. The impact on
children is dramatized further by statistics indicating that up to one-third
of the school-age population are "latchkey children, ' 267 and that parents
now spend forty percent less time with their children than they did
twenty-five years ago.268
The analysis of work/family conflict as the problem of marginalized
caregiving holds the potential to create alliances among a broad range of
women: childless career women,269 employed mothers overburdened by
262 See R. Sidel, supra note 209, at 3.
263 See Kong, supra note 197, at 1.
264 R. Sidel, supra note 209, at 117 (two-thirds of center-based caregivers earn below pov-
erty-level wages; 87% of family day-care workers earn below minimum wage).
265 See Heidi I. Hartmann & Diana M. Pearce, High Skill and Low Pay: The Economics of
Child Care Work 2, 19-20 (1989) (turnover in child-care work is twice national average).
266 Celia Duggen, Tiny Incomes, Little Help for Single Mothers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31,
1992, at Al.
267 See J. Schor, supra note 229, at 12 (quoting Diane S. Burden & Bradley Googins, Boston
University, Balancing Job and Homelife Study 21 (Table 12) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author)).
268 See Galston, supra note 254, at 40.
269 I recognize that not all woman want children, and thus many women are not childless
but child-free. However, many career women feel their childlessness is a sacrifice they would
rather not have made to protect their ideal-worker status. See text accompanying notes 209-10
supra.
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the second shift, homemakers, single mothers, and child care workers.
This contrasts sharply with the career-woman-versus-housewife dynamic
vividly illustrated in the current presidential campaign. Hillary Clinton's
defense of her decision to pursue her career rather than "stay home, bake
cookies and have teas" dramatized how the various forms of dis-
empowerment experienced by different groups of women serve to divide
them. Professional women are disempowered when one of the country's
hundred top lawyers270 has to defend and justify her career in a context
where a man would be required only to avoid too obvious a strut. Home-
makers are disempowered when Clinton's defense seems to endorse socie-
tal devaluation of housewives. 271 A rhetoric is needed that allows
women to unite in opposition to the current disempowered social con-
struction of caregiving, rather than turning on each other to defend
against their particular type of disempowerment.
A strong protest against the marginalization of caregivers also pro-
vides a forceful response to a growing number of social commentators,
alarmed by the plight of American children, who argue that feminists'
insistence on workplace equality is misguided because children end up
paying too high a price.272 These commentators perpetuate the old story
that the only way to protect children, in a system where child nurture is
achieved by privatizing childrearing costs onto mothers, is through strict
enforcement of selfless motherhood. 273 The alternative, of course, is to
rearrange things so that the pursuit of self-interest by others does not
depend on sacrifices made by mothers. This would require redesigning
the expectations of those "others" to include as part of their adult goals
the meeting of children's legitimate needs. It would, in short, involve a
challenge to the notion that caregivers should "naturally" be marginal-
ized from the (other) accepted forms of adult self-development. As the
childhood poverty statistics show, mothers have no choice but to insist
270 See Hillary Clinton Said Equal Partner Presidential Race, Reuter Libr. Rep., Mar. 18,
1992.
271 See The Half-Baked Response to Hillary Clinton, Wash. Post, Apr. 4, 1992, at A21;
Deciding to Stay Home-No Piece of Cake, Wash. Post, Mar. 28, 1992, at A19; Gwen Ifill,
The 1992 Campaign: Hillary Clinton Defends Her Conduct in Law Firm, N.Y. Times, Mar.
17, 1992, at A20. Clinton quickly adjusted her rhetoric to signal respect for homemaking. See
Christopher B. Daly, Hillary Clinton Faults Washington's Values, Wash. Post, May 30, 1992,
at A1O.
272 See, e.g., Christopher Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World xvi (1975); William Rasp-
berry, Doing What's Best for Children, Wash. Post, July 26, 1991, at A23 (arguing that child-
care fosters gender equality in workplace but fails to provide best environment for child
development).
273 Alice Kessler-Harris explores historical examples in which "the male's historical prerog-
atives were sustained by the moral claims of the family." Alice Kessler-Harris, A Woman's
Wage 103 (1990).
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on this alternative. Given the rate of single motherhood, 274 the divorce
rate,275 and the fact that many divorced mothers have to support their
children largely alone,276 millions of children are going to be relegated to
poverty if mothers continue to marginalize themselves economically in
order to meet their children's needs. Truly responsible motherhood to-
day means resisting economic marginalization.
My sense of the potential power of this argument crystallized when I
heard a relative counselling her daughter. "Even if you are going to get
married," she said, "you'd better have a career. Look at your cousin."
She married at twenty and was left at the age of twenty-four with two
children under three and a child support payment of thirty-five dollars a
week. The hardships that ensued left everyone shaken in her working-
class circle in rustbelt New England.
The impoverishment of women upon divorce, and in particular its
impact upon children, is a potentially revolutionary force for gender
equality. It is powerful because it aligns demands for gender equality
with the mandates of domesticity: women must demand equality to pro-
tect their children. This alignment could help diffuse the long-standing
divide between feminist and nonfeminist women. For middle-class femi-
nists whose demands have focused on access to traditionally male jobs,
the key demand has been equality both within the home and outside it.
This position appeals to some working class women, but not to many
others, who might well be persuaded that the marginalization of mothers
is unconscionable because of its impact on children. 277
The alignment of demands for gender equality and domesticity
holds tremendous potential, but this potential easily could be wasted. A
chief threat is the ideology of choice. Women consigned to careers sub-
servient to those of their husbands are under tremendous pressure to
agree with the generally accepted interpretation that they end up eco-
nomically marginalized because of "choices" that reflect their personal
priorities. This insistent focus on the "choices" of individual actors de-
flects attention from the truly stunning consistency with which it "hap-
274 The U.S. Bureau of Census, Marriage and Family Division, reports that as of 1991,
28.9% of all families were single parent families. Of the 28.9% one parent families, 86.5% are
headed by women. Steve Rawlings, Bureau of Census, Marriage and Family Division, House-
hold and Family Characteristics No. 458, at 3 (1991); Telephone Interview with Kathy
O'Brien, Statician, U.S. Bureau of Census, Marriage and Family Division (May 27, 1992).
275 Close to 50% of marriages now end in divorce. See Singer, supra note 252, at 1103.
Since 1960, the total number of children affected by divorce has more than tripled-over half
of all children will experience marital disruption by the time they are eighteen. L. Weitzman,
supra note 214, at 215.
276 See text accompanying notes 253-54 supra.
277 For a discussion of the reasons why feminism has limited appeal to many blue-collar
women, see E. Rosen, supra note 248, at 169-92.
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pens" to be wives who "choose" careers that "accommodate their
children's needs," while husbands continue (as they always have) to per-
form as ideal workers. Thus the first step in challenging the current sys-
tem, in which children's and mothers' needs are subsumed to men's
ambitions, is to destabilize the rhetoric of choice. The remainder of this
Part begins this process.
B. The Rhetoric of Choice in the Context of Work/Family Conflict
L Choice Rhetoric Inside and Outside the Law
Perhaps the best-known example of the "choice" argument inside
the law is Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) v. Sears
Roebuck & Co. 278 In that case, Sears successfully countered statistical
evidence of discrimination with the argument that women's relative ab-
sence from commission sales jobs, which paid roughly twice as much as
the noncommission sales jobs in which women predominated, 279 was due
to their lack of interest in commission sales work.280 Women's focus on
relationships at home and at work made them choose to sacrifice worldly
advancement in favor of a supportive and friendly work environment and
limited hours that accommodated their family responsibilities. 281 Sears's
argument, that women's marginalized economic position resulted from
choices that reflected their personal priorities, is the core of the "choice"
argument in the context of women and work. This argument pervades
Title VII litigation and is accepted widely by liberal as well as conserva-
tive courts.282
Justice Antonin Scalia, in his dissenting opinion in the affirmative
action case of Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 283 adopted the "lack of
interest" analysis in a somewhat different context. The low percentage of
female roadworkers, Scalia argued, reflected the fact that "because of
longstanding social attitudes, [such work] has not been regarded by
women themselves as desirable work. ' 284 He intimated that women's
278 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
279 Schultz, supra note 245, at 1752 n.5.
280 See Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1305-15; 839 F.2d at 324-30, 334-38.
281 This point emerged clearly in historian Rosalind Rosenberg's testimony on behalf of
Sears. See Sears, 628 F.Supp. at 1308; Offer of Proof Concerning the Testimony of Dr. Rosa-
lind Rosenberg at paras. 11, 16-22, EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D.
Ill. 1986) (No. 79-C-4373); Schultz, supra note 245, at 1803-04 (describing Rosenberg
testimony).
282 See generally Schultz, supra note 245, at 1758-99 (analyzing 54 federal sex discrimina-
tion cases from 1972 to 1989 in which "lack of interest" argument was raised).
283 480 U.S. 616, 657-77 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
284 Id. at 668 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (county transportation agency
sued by male employee alleging Title VII violation after agency promoted female employee
over him for road dispatcher position).
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lack of representation in roadwork crews stemmed from "the qualifica-
tions and desires of women. '285
"Choice" rhetoric appears in the law on the family as well as the
work side of work/family conflict. For example, the choice argument is
implicit in refusals of divorce courts to reimburse the wife for "family
decisions" to subordinate her career for the husband's benefit. 28 6 As a
result, courts often deny adequate compensation to wives who sidelined
careers to support their husbands' education 287 or mothers who assumed
childcare responsibilities so that their husbands could perform as ideal
workers. 28 8 Although judges are more subtle, a student in my Property
class accurately expressed the theory underlying such rulings: "If a
woman takes time off to spend with her kids," he said, "that's her choice.
Don't expect me to pay for it."
The rhetoric of choice is widespread among commentators as well.
For example, in her now famous article which generated the "mommy
track" debate, Felice Schwartz noted, "The career-and-family woman is
willing to trade off the pressures and demands that go with promotion for
the freedom to spend more time with her children." 289 Schwartz's de-
tractors share her choice rhetoric. Betty Friedan, attacking Schwartz's
analysis as "retrofeminism," asserted "there are not two types of women.
All women must have the real choices.... How they put it together,
their priorities at different times, is a matter of individual choice. '290
Both sameness 291 feminists and difference292 feminists use the rhetoric of
285 Id. at 660 ("qualifications and desires of women may fail to match the Agency's platonic
ideal of a work force").
286 See, e.g., Singer, supra note 252, at 1115 ("Because courts generally do not recognize
career assets as marital property, current property division rules... do not result in anywhere
near an equal sharing of the fruits of most marriages.").
287 See L. Weitzman, supra note 214, at 124-29 (describing courts' treatment of "new prop-
erty" such as degrees).
288 For a sampling of recent scholarship on the subject, see, e.g., Martha L. Fineman, The
Illusion of Equality: The Rhetoric and Reality of Divorce Reform (1991); Twila L. Perry, No-
Fault Divorce and Liability Without Fault: Can Family Law Learn from Torts?, 52 Ohio St.
L.J. 55 (1991); Bea Ann Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution
Fails, 68 Texas L.R. 689 (1990); June Carbone, Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention of
Alimony, 43 Vand. L. Rev 1463 (1990); June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Mar-
riage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 953 (1991);
Singer, supra note 252; Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1989);
Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and Alimony: The Division of
Property to Address Need, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 827 (1988).
289 Schwartz, supra note 207, at 71.
290 See Beyette, supra note 242, at 1.
291 See, e.g., Herma H. Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce
and Its Aftermath, 56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 79-87 (1987) (discussing whether social differences,
such as traditional "assignment" of caregiving role to mothers, should be taken into account in
affording women equality in divorce); Herna H. Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault
Divorce Law, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 291, 316 (1987); see also David L. Kirp, Gender Justice 181-83
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choice when discussing whether alimony should be restructured in re-
sponse to wives' traditional marginalization, as do economics scholars
who have little affinity for feminist analysis. 293 Indeed, the rhetoric of
choice is hard to avoid, and even critics of the rhetoric find themselves
using it.294
The mommy track debate highlights an important dynamic in the
rhetoric of choice. Choice rhetoric clearly privileges the life patterns of
the relatively affluent, predominantly white "essential women" who can
"choose" against employment. 295 After all, the two-thirds of American
women who are single, divorced, or married to men who earn less than
$15,000 a year 296 clearly cannot "choose" not to work; these women are
not at the center of society's vision of women and work. The notion that
women "choose" economic marginalization begins with relatively afflu-
ent women and then is generalized to include all women, even those who
must work. At the extreme, as in Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2 9 7 choice rhetoric can be used to justify
outright discrimination by calling up vivid images of selfless mothers
choosing family over career in a context that involved working class
women, who often view going out to work as part of their obligations as
mothers. 298
An examination of media coverage of work/family conflict reflects
patterns of reporting. In articles about women's double burden of do-
(1986) (laying framework for equal liberty argument for gender policy and analyzing Supreme
Court decisions in that light).
292 See, e.g., Mary E. O'Connell, Alimony After No-Fault: A Practice in Search of a The-
ory, 23 New Eng. L. Rev. 437, 503-05 (1988) (exploring and advocating revitalization of ali-
mony as step toward solving gender-based equality).
293 See, e.g., Cynthia B. Lloyd & Beth T. Niemi, The Economics of Sex Differentials 88-150
(1979) (describing relative economic status of men and women and how this status has
changed over time); Solomon W. Polacheck, Discontinuous Labor Force Participation and Its
Effect on Women's Market Earnings in Sex, Discrimination, and the Division of Labor 90
(Cynthia B. Lloyd ed., 1975) (comparing wage differentials between women and men with
similar labor market attributes); see also Victor Fuchs, Women's Quest for Economic Equality
68 (1988) (presenting analysis of statistics on gender-based wage differentials and using lan-
guage of "preferences"). But see Barbara R. Bergmann, The Economic Emergence of Women
(1986) (statistical analysis of gender-based economic study).
294 See, e.g., Carbone & Brinig, supra note 288, at 984, 1001, 1004; Dowd, Gender Paradox,
supra note 203, at 90, 102, 149 (consistently putting choice in quotes); Rhode, supra note 20, at
1214; Williams, Deconstructing Gender, supra note 187, at 819, 823, 830-31.
295 For an influential discussion of essentialism, see Elizabeth Spelman, Inessential Woman
(1988).
296 Anne Machung, Talking Career, Thinking Job: Gender Differences in Career and Fam-
ily Expectations of Berkeley Seniors, 15 Feminist Stud. 35 (1989).
297 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), af'd. 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
298 For feminist analysis of Sears, see Schultz, supra note 245, at 1753-54, 1796, 1803-04,
1809-10; Williams, Deconstructing Gender, supra note 187, at 813-21; Joan W. Scott, Decon-
structing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, The Use of Post-Structuralist Theory for Feminism,
14 Feminist Stud. 33, 39-45 (1988).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 66:1559
HeinOnline -- 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1610 1991
SELFLESS WOMEN
mestic and wage labor, women's position is depicted as both undesirable
and unfair.299 One article, for example, described as "the martyr syn-
drome" a female executive rising at five in the morning so that her
twelve-hour work days would end in time for evenings with her chil-
dren.30° The imagery changes abruptly, however, once the overburdened
woman quits: then the realm of martyrdom becomes the republic of
choice.301 An article by Patricia Wald of the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals admonishes younger women: "It may be that the
conscientious parent of a young child cannot simultaneously be in high-
powered litigation. There are trade-offs in life and in practice; women
need to accept that. o30 2
When women themselves adopt the imagery of choice to describe
their decisions to quit, they express two different moods. The first is up-
beat, captured in an article celebrating career women's decisions to "go
home again." "It's not anti-feminist.... It's a way of living life to the
fullest," said one studier of such trends.30 3 This quotation aptly captures
a basic premise: that women's decisions to leave the workforce are an
expression, not a debarment, from their membership in the republic of
choice-they quit to pursue the free unfolding of their personalities.
The second strain of choice rhetoric is more regretful and conflicted.
Said Deborah Lenz, a mother who gave up a career to work part-time in
an unrelated field in order to spend more time with her two toddler sons:
There are so many hard questions. When there was no choice,
maybe it was easier. Now there's a choice, which is good, but
it's hard to make that choice. There are times when I'd really
like to be out there in the career I more or less gave up. But I
couldn't stand losing the time with my children.30 4
299 See, e.g., Kantrowitz, supra note 199, at 48; Claudia Wallis, Scott Brown, Mellisa
Ludtke & Martha Smilgis, Onward, Women!, Time, Dec. 4, 1989, at 80.
300 Elizabeth Ehrlich, The Mommy Track, Bus. Week, Mar. 20, 1989, at 126 (quoting busi-
ness executive Linda E. Chinn). Another article quoted a researcher and concluded that work-
ing mothers were "the martyrs of the household." Philip Shenon, What's New With Dual-
Career Couples, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1983, at § 3, at 29.
301 See, e.g., Mary C. Hickey, The Part-Time Professionals, Wash. Post, Oct. 11, 1988, at
D5 ("The choice of part-time work for professionals has become popular in recent years as one
way to balance family and work and career.").
302 Wald, supra note 244, at 78. Note how Wald's initial gender-neutral formulation veils
the message that mothers, not all parents, should make realistic choices and drop out of the
professional career path.
303 Brenda L. Richardson, Professional Women Do Go Home Again, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20,
1988, at Cl, CIO (quoting Faith Popcorn, chairperson of firm specializing in trends). The
commentator continued that wives' quitting gives couples "time to strategize, time to get
things done and time for sex."
304 Lisa Belkin, Bars to Equality of Sexes Seen as Eroding, Slowly, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29,
1989, § 1, at 1.
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Again, the rhetoric of choice identifies the problem of work/family con-
flict as a matter of the priorities of the ungendered actor in the republic
of choice. Compare with this attitude the statement made by an associ-
ate working in a large law firm:
The biggest problem as I see it for both men and women is how
to balance children in a large-firm environment. I plan to go
part-time when I have a child, and I hate the idea. If the firm
had a 24-hour day care or nursery, I would not work part-
time-I would stay full-time. Obviously, even this is no solu-
tion: kids can't grow up in a day care center.30 5
By avoiding the rhetoric of choice, the associate places the blame outside
herself and onto the constraints that frame her realm of choice. Here lies
the core of my objection to the rhetoric of choice: if a rapist puts a knife
to your throat and offers you a choice of rape or sodomy, you do not
celebrate your "choice"-you protest the range of choices offered as fun-
damentally unacceptable. This is all I am asking women to do. 3°6
2. Choice and False Consciousness
In a 1986 article entitled Deconstructing Gender, I argued that the
ideology of domesticity "encourages women to 'choose' economic
marginalization and celebrate that choice as a badge of virtue. ' 30 7 Do-
mesticity, I argued, is "designed to enlist women in their own oppres-
sion," and succeeds "every time a woman 'chooses' to subordinate her
career 'for the good of the family,' and congratulates herself on that
choice as a mature assessment of her own 'priorities.' "308 Kathryn
Abrams criticizes both myself and Catharine MacKinnon for depicting
women as contributing "to their own subordination... with only limited
understanding of the constraints on their choices and little sense of these
choices as systematically self-destructive. ' 30 9 Her sense is that by chal-
lenging the ideology of choice I am being dismissive of women's struggles
and presumptuous in judging them.310
305 Emily Couric, Women in the Large Firms: A Higher Price of Admission?, Nat'l L.J.,
Dec. 11, 1989, at S2, S12.
306 I do not mean to imply that rapists ordinarily consult their victims about anything. This
hypothetical is based on advice I received in a rape workshop in the 1970s, in which women
were advised that they might suggest that a rapist sodomize them instead of having sexual
intercourse if they were concerned about pregnancy. It struck me as odd advice, although no
doubt it was meant to be helpful.
307 Williams, supra note 187, at 819.
308 Id. at 830.
309 Abrams, supra note 20, at 767-68.
310 Id. at 780-83. I should note that the article quoted is part of an ongoing process in
which Kathryn Abrams consistently has challenged and helped me to think through and artic-
ulate my ideas more thoroughly. I thank her.
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I hope I am not. This charge is an important one because it reveals
a risk inherent in challenging the liberal ideology of choice. Given the
ideology's premise that people are free actors rationally pursuing their
own self-interest, any claim that the much-vaunted "choices" reflect deep
patterns of inequality seems to deny women of agency and to reduce
them to the status of prisoners of false consciousness mindlessly working
against their own best interests.
This is a false dichotomy, for every decision is a situated one, reflect-
ing both constraints and the exercise of personal control.311 The brilliant
work of Natalie Zemon Davis312 reveals the complex interaction between
agency and constraint.313 In an essay on women's sense of self in six-
teenth-century France, she explores the ways in which "a patriarchal
family unit could stimulate people within its borders towards self-discov-
ery and self-presentation. '314 Even in the context of the formal subjec-
tion of women to their husbands' power, women managed to find
strategies for self-discovery and self-presentation.31 5 Davis reveals how
women's memoirs simultaneously perpetuate the image of patriarchal
power "while maneuvering for some sense of self within it,"316 focusing
on Jeanne du Laurens's "The Genealogy of Messieurs du Laurens."
Although the work's very title bows to patriarchal convention by omit-
ting mention of the family's wives and daughters, the story is really about
how the author's widowed mother Louise used "limited means and re-
311 For a subtle and sophisticated exploration of this point, see Martha Minow, Identities, 3
Yale J. L. & Human. 97, 127-30 (1991).
312 Natalie Zemon Davis, Boundaries and Sense of Self in Sixteenth-Century France, in
Reconstructing Individualism 53 (Thomas Heller et al. eds., 1986).
313 My thanks to Milton Regan for encouraging me to speak in the abstract about con-
straint and choice as socially constructed and strategic categories. A crucial challenge is to
avoid falling into the trap of assuming that women either conform to the liberal model of free-
standing individuals making choices or are imprisoned by false consciousness. The work of
Antonio Gramsci provides needed subtlety by focusing on the complexities surrounding con-
sent. Two articles that provide an excellent introduction to Gramsci are T.J. Jackson Lears,
The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities, 90 Am. Hist. Rev. 507
(1985), and Joseph Femia, Hegemony and Consciousness in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci,
23 Pol. Stud. 29 (1975). I have suggested that American women have a "contradictory con-
sciousness" that mixes approbation with apathy, resistance and resignation. Williams, Decon-
structing Gender, supra note 187, at 829. This Article attempts to describe more concretely
American women's "contradictory consciousness." I do not condemn consciousness as "false"
from a perspective where my own view constitutes absolute truth as some have claimed. See
Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 254, 294 (1992). My
own perspective is, nonetheless, to me a (situated not an absolute) moral certainty. See Joan
Williams, Abortion, Incommensurability and Jurisprudence, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 1651 (1989) (rec-
onciling existence of ethical certainties with absence of absolutes); Joan Williams, Rorty, Radi-
calism, Romanticism: The Politics of the Gaze, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 131 (same).
314 Davis, supra note 312, at 59.
315 Id.
316 Id.
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markable ingenuity" to arrange eight sons' careers and two daughters'
marriages. Louise and her daughter both stress that she acted as her
husband's agent, inspired by his life; she discusses herself only late in the
story, after first a discussion of les enfants (the children), followed by a
discussion of les filles (the daughters). "Readers may think they are
hearing little about Jeanne's values and feelings-until they realize this
seventy-one-year-old woman, the survivor, has put words in everyone's
mouth: her father's deathbed speech, her mother's scolding and
exhortations. '3 17
Was Jeanne a victim of false consciousness? Or was she, like the
rest of us, struggling to maneuver for some sense of self within a social
context replete with constraints, many of which are disabling, some of
which are enabling, and most of which are both, either at different times
or simultaneously? The "choice versus false consciousness" dichotomy
ignores the complexity of these issues in a way that intimates that any
sustained focus on the constraints within which choices occur signals a
disrespect for the actor so constrained. This sets up a powerful dynamic
of social control. The "free choice versus false consciousness" model
makes it seem as though any attempt to challenge patriarchal constraints
signals disrespect for women who work within them. However, one can
appreciate women's ingenuity and dignity without failing to note how
their lives could be improved if those constraints were changed.
A challenge to choice rhetoric in the particular context of work/
family conflict signals a belief that the constraints that frame women's
choices about work and family are both unacceptable and susceptible to
challenge in that context. This does not mean that choice rhetoric is
always the wrong approach to public discussion of a problem. In the
abortion context, choice rhetoric retains significant strengths, for
although it focuses attention away from the constraints within which
abortion decisions occur,3 18 the key issue remains the defense of an ex-
isting realm of choice.319 In the context of work/family conflict, by con-
317 Id.
318 Both right-to-life and pro-choice advocates acknowledge that abortion decisions often
reflect male power and/or society's refusal to support caregivers. See, e.g., K. McDonnell,
supra note 149, at 68-80 (discussing economic and other forms of coercion behind abortion
choices); G. Naylor, supra note 149, at 91; Abrams, supra note 20, at 786-88 (pro-choice argu-
ment that abortion decisions often reflect male power over women); Callahan, supra note 191
(pro-life demand that society support caregivers); MacKinnon, supra note 78 (pro-choice argu-
ment that abortion decisions often reflect male power over women).
319 The key methodological assumption here is that language does not simply reflect the
"glassy essence" of reality. See R. Rorty, supra note 150, at 15, 129-212. Instead, all rhetorics
focus attention away from some issues and onto others. The key inquiry is how to design a
rhetoric that channels attention in a way best suited to accomplish one's political and ethical
goals. See Williams, Virtue and Oppression, supra note 150 (discussing rhetorics that
persuade).
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trast, women's relegation to no-win alternatives should be challenged
through an attack on the rhetoric of choice.
In summary, although liberal thought patterns encourage us to-
wards a dichotomy of absolute agency or absolute victimization, neither
of these poles is an accurate description of anybody. The point is not
that women are passive victims of ideology, but that calling their painful
resolutions of work/family conflicts their "choices" deflects our attention
away from the constraints within which they.operate. 320 The following
section seeks to help remedy that phenomenon.
3. Telling Stories About Women, Work, and Family3 1
The rhetoric of choice is so deeply reflexive in the work/family con-
text that we need narratives to help break its grip. Luckily, ample
sources exist. Sociologists Arle Hochschild 322 and Kathleen Gerson
have written vivid narrative studies of the work/family conflict. 323 In
addition, the media has provided extensive coverage of work/family con-
flict, replete with stories from the lives of individual women. Finally, as
this is a pre-eninent issue of my generation of professional women, I rely
on my own stories as well.
a. The Power Dynamics Underlying "Choice. " Gerson's most cru-
cial findings indicate that women's commitment to work normally dimin-
ishes in the face of boring, dead-end, devalued work and that gender
privilege within the household often relegates women to such work.324
The stories of two of her interviewees illustrate the pattern of initial ca-
reer orientation followed by falling work aspirations.
One woman is Vicki.3 25 From early on Vicki wanted to join the
police, a career she saw as a mental and physical challenge and a way of
escaping her parents' poverty. After high school she took and passed the
320 For an influential formulation of this point, see Alice Kessler-Harris, Written Testimony
of Alice Kessler-Harris, in Women's History Goes to Trial: EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck and
Company, 11 Signs: J. Women in Culture & Soe'y 751, 767 (1986) ("choice can be understood
only within the framework of available opportunity").
321 With apologies to Vicki Schultz. See Schultz, supra note 245 (subtitled Telling Stories
about Women and Work).
322 See A. Hochschild, supra note 201, at 33-58, 75-94, 95-109, 110-127, 142-58, 173-81.
323 See K. Gerson, supra note 210, at 11-20 (1985); see also E. Rosen, supra note 248, at 92-
119 (sociological study of work and family commitments of blue-collar women).
324 K. Gerson, supra note 210, at 93-122. For extensive documentation of the phenomenon
of diminishing commitment, see Schultz, supra note 245, at 1824-39 and sources cited therein.
Schultz also provides extensive documentation that many women ultimately reject domesticity
if attractive work opportunities become available. See id. at 1815-32; see also K. Gerson, supra
note 210, at 69-91. This pattern does not demonstrate the power dynamic that leads women to
cut back on work commitments, but it reinforces the message that women's "choices" are very
much a function of their work opportunities. See Schultz, supra note 245, at 1815-32.
325 See K. Gerson, supra note 210, at 18-20.
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police exam, but was forced to find the best job she could, in the "pink
collar" ghetto of secretarial work. Meanwhile, she met and married Joe,
a construction worker, whose job "required that they move a lot. '3 26
Consequently, Vicki changed jobs often and turned down a chance to
advance. As Gerson tells the rest of the story:
She ultimately grew to hate working, for it usually involved tak-
ing orders from bosses she did not respect.
Joe also began to pressure her to have children. Children
were very important to Joe, for he had been orphaned and
wanted to give his children the love he never received. Vicki
viewed children as a burden she could do without, but Joe even
threatened to leave her if they did not start a family soon. She
decided that losing Joe was too heavy a price to pay for her fears
and became pregnant in her late twenties.
After the birth of her first child, Vicki discovered that stay-
ing home to rear a child was more rewarding than her succes-
sion of boring, dead-end jobs. By her mid-thirties, she was a
full-time mother of two.
Today she has given up hope of becoming a policewoman,
but in return for this sacrifice she feels she has gained the secure
home life she never knew as a child. She occasionally considers
taking a part-time job, but she hopes she will never have to re-
turn to the full-time work she grew to abhor. She worries that,
if something ever happened to Joe or the marriage, she would be
forced out of the home again.3 27
An important theme emerges from a close examination of Vicki's
"hard choice." Because her husband's career was given priority over
hers, Vicki was cut off from a career she viewed as potentially exciting
and tied to dead-end, subservient work. Thus, Joe was allowed to live
out his childhood aspirations both to be successful at work and to redeem
his orphaned childhood. Vicki sacrificed her childhood dream so Joe
could attain his. Calling Vicki's estrangement from wage labor her
"choice" veils the fact that her husband's gender privilege within the
household so thoroughly disrupted her career that she was relegated to
subservient "women's work" that did not contribute to the "free un-
folding" of her personality. 328 Even before she ultimately quit, she had
to choose between her family and her career aspirations, a choice her
husband never faced.
326 Id. at 18. Note the non-blaming passive voice: Joe did not require her to move; his job
did.
327 Id. at 18-19.
328 See L. Friedman, supra note 6, at 35.
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Following her usual pattern, Gerson matches Vicki's story with one
of a middle-class woman named Susan whose life followed a similar tra-
jectory. 329 Susan's mother worked part-time to help her family through
financial difficulties and had high aspirations for her two children. In-
spired by her mother, Susan decided to have a career. In college, she
married John, whose education "required her economic support as well
as her attention to the household tasks. ' 330 So Susan dropped her plans
to pursue a business degree and received a teaching credential, which
could be earned quickly. She did this despite being unenthusiastic about
working with children. Unable to find a primary school teaching job,
Susan eventually settled for preschool teaching, where, Gerson reports
she has "grown steadily weary of the demanding work and lack of
chances for advancement. ' 331 Meanwhile, her husband is making pro-
gress as an architect, and "has begun to complain that he wants more of
her attention directed to their life together."'332 Susan plans to get preg-
nant and resign since, ironically, motherhood now represents "her best
chance to escape from the world of children that defines her job. '333
Despite the class differential, Susan also abandoned a career as a
cost of her marriage; her husband was the only one who could "have it
all." Like Vicki, Susan's rejection of the gendered, subservient work in a
sex-segregated marketplace led her to quit.334 It is inaccurate to refer to
the confluence in Vicki and Susan's lives of gender privilege within the
household and sex segregation outside it as their "free choice." This does
not mean that Vicki and Susan did not know their own minds. It simply
means that using choice rhetoric to describe their decisions deflects atten-
tion from the framework of gender privilege that relegated them to
choices far less attractive than those their husbands enjoyed.
The rhetoric of choice veils the extent to which entitlement to self-
development is gendered in contemporary American life. Men feel enti-
tled to simultaneous self-development in both work and family life as an
element of their manhood, even if their wives have to sacrifice their own
career aspirations. Men's self-development becomes parasitic on the self-
lessness of women. Hochschild confirms that these norms carry on even
when women, unlike Vicki and Susan, are not deflected from pursuing
329 See K. Gerson, supra note 210, at 17-20.
330 Id. at 17. Note again the non-blaming passive voice: John did not require her; his educa-
tion did.
331 Id. at 18.
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 The disillusionment of the Vickis and the Susans with a workplace they find acutely
alienating may well result in their articulating their decisions to quit in terminology reminis-
cent of domesticity's "cri de coeur against modem work relations." See N. Cott, supra note
25, at 70; see also text accompanying notes 58-60 infra.
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traditionally male careers. Most vivid is her story of Seth and Jessica
Stein.335
Seth is a litigation lawyer, married to Jessica, who specializes in
family law. They married intending to honor their degrees equally. But
"after many reasonable discussions," notes Hochschild, they agreed that
his career would come first because "litigation law was more demand-
ing."' 336 Seth, reports Hochschild, was happy about this outcome but at
the same time was somewhat unhappy about his marriage. His wife was
unhappy about both. Despite having made her own "choice," which
eventually led her to cut down to part-time, Jessica never really forgave
Seth. Her disappointment led her to withdraw to a substantial extent
from both her children and her marriage.
Hochschild is extraordinarily acute in assessing Seth's motivations.
Like many elite men, he had no articulated aversion to "women's work."
"If he'd had the time," Hochschild notes, "he could have done the laun-
dry or sewing without a bit of shame. '337 But in fact he did little at
home because his eleven-hour workdays meant he was rarely there.
How could a man with a commitment to equality end up dumping
such a heavy burden on his wife? The key, Hochschild notes, lies with
Seth's "sense of self and manhood, '338 which is entirely dependent on
reaffirmation from the world of work.339 That interpretation does not
seem quite accurate, however, as Seth seems hurt and confused by the
failure of his family life.340 Hochschild captures Seth's feeling that he
lacks the choice about whether or not to work so hard. 341 She paints
Jessica as bitter because she designed her career to balance work and
335 See A. Hochschild, supra note 201, at 110-27.
336 Id. at 111.
337 Id. at 112. This is a common formulation in a high-status couple, see Model, supra note
226, at 201, but one that begs the question. One of my law school classmates, an associate at a
large law firm known for long hours, expressed his interest in adjunct teaching. Slightly earlier
in the conversation he had noted how great it was that his wife had found a job that, while not
truly exciting, allowed her to work part-time and close to home in order to spend more time
with their two-year old. My classmate clearly felt entitled to pursue all available avenues of
adult self-development-not only his career, but extra responsibilities as well-while he as-
sumed his wife was entitled neither to extra opportunities nor to her career itself. One assumes
he did little child-care or housework because he "did not have the time."
338 A. Hochschild, supra note 201, at 112.
339 Id. at 112-14. Studies suggest that men in general view their ability to fulfill the "pro-
vider role" as the index of their achievement. See Lucia A. Gilbert & Vicki Rachlin, Mental
Health and Psychological Functioning of Dual-Career Families, 15 Counselling Psychologist
7, 15-16 (1987).
340 See A. Hochschild, supra note 201, at 115, 118-19. Studies show that men become
dependent on women's unconditional acceptance and nurturance as they become more in-
dependent in their lives outside the home. See Gilbert & Rachlin, supra note 340, at 17.
341 See A. Hochschild, supra note 201, at 113-14. For an insightful discussion of how males
need to "revise their sense of self" if dual-career couples are to achieve equality, see Gilbert &
Rachlin, supra note 339, at 15-19.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 66:1559
HeinOnline -- 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1618 1991
SELFLESS WOMEN
family life and expected her husband to do so too.3 42 When he did not,
she was left with little choice but to go part-time.
Hochschild concludes that the heart of the problem is men's unwill-
ingness to share the second shift. This analysis may well be apt in many
contexts, but it is only part of the story, as many women lawyers know.
A recent American Bar Association survey reports that eleven percent of
all lawyers work more that 240 hours a month (an average of sixty hours
a week) and forty-four percent work more than 200 hours a month.343 At
some of the largest and most elite law firms in New York, Washington,
Los Angeles, and other major American cities, part-time hours are nine
to five, five days a week, while full-time work may require being on call
around the clock.344 Fully sixty-five percent of all surveyed lawyers in
large firms reported a lack of time for themselves as a negative factor in
their jobs. 345 Women, who are twice as likely as men to be dissatisfied
with legal work,346 report dissatisfaction with "lack of time for oneself"
in higher percentages than men.3 47
Jobs whose work cultures require long hours create a dynamic
Hochschild does not capture. In order for Jessica to realize her ideal of
work and family life, both she and Seth would have to eschew the "fast
track." The problem, then, is not so much with Seth, as with a work
culture that requires ideal workers either to remain childless or to tap a
flow of domestic services and be willing to delegate virtually all childrear-
ing tasks.348
342 See A. Hochschild, supra note 201, at 116.
343 Ronald L. Hirsch, Are You On Target?, 12 Barrister 17, 20 (1985). The average
number of hours billed has risen to between 2300 and 2500 annually, up from about 1700
several years ago. See Jennifer A. Kingson, Women in the Law Say Path is Limited by
"Mommy Track," N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1988, at Al.
344 See Kingson, supra note 343, at A15.
345 See Hirsch, supra note 343, at 20.
346 Wald, supra note 244, at 75.
347 Ronald L. Hirsch, Will Women Leave The Law?, 16 Barrister 22, 25 (1989)(57% of
women, 45% of men). Contributing to women lawyers' dissatisfaction is the lack of intellec-
tual challenge in their jobs (18% of women, 12% of men), a cold and impersonal work envi-
ronment (23% of women, 7% of men), little chance of advancement (25% of women, 20% of
men), and the fact that advancement is not determined by work quality (21% of women, 16%
of men). Id. at 24-25.
348 Constance Perin has made crucial contributions to the study of the cultural construction
of careers today, in particular to pervasive workaholic norms. See Perin, supra note 239; Con-
stance Perin, The Moral Fabric of the Office: Panopticon Discourse and Schedule Flexibilities,
8 Res. Soc. Organizations 241, 252 (1991); Constance Perin, Some Cultural Properties of Ca-
reers, Invited Session of The American Anthropological Association Annual Conference, New
Orleans, Nov. 1990; Constance Perin, Temporal Snares and Personal Delusions in Career Dis-
course: Toward a New Rhetoric for Employment Relationships, Panel of the Property Law
Section, Association of American Law Schools Annual Conference, San Francisco, Jan. 1990.
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b. The Domestic Delegation Doctrine. The workaholic work cul-
tures common among American elites highlight an issue at the center of
the current controversies over working parents: the extent to which
child care is delegable. Let me begin with a story that, I am assured,
happens all the time. A mother, overwhelmed as her career heated up,
confronted her husband with a detailed calculation of the hours she, he,
and their live-in nanny devoted to household tasks. She devoted thirty
hours, he thirteen, and the nanny over sixty. Something has got to give,
she told him; I just cannot do any more and get done what I have to do
at work. His solution: hire another nanny. He is not an uncaring father:
he just has a work ethic similar to Seth's. The end result was that the
woman cut down on work and started talking about the inherent differ-
ences between men and women. She looked back at her life and decided
that sex differences are "real" after all. She ignored her daughter's ag-
gressiveness and focused on her love of dresses; she ignored her son's
timidity and focused on his love of climbing. In both cases, by carefully
blocking the character traits that contradict gender stereotypes and high-
lighting those that confirm stereotypes, she reassured herself of the "nat-
ural" gender differences between men and women.
I interpret the incident quite differently, although I agree that it in-
volved a gender show-down in which true gender differences emerged. 349
The key gender difference is that most mothers are much less willing
than fathers to view children's needs as completely delegable. Tradi-
tional fatherhood rests on the assumption that virtually all of parenting is
delegable; traditional motherhood does not.
The issue of delegation is central to work/family conflict, although
it rarely is discussed. Instead, women tend to internalize the conflict
they feel between their sense of what is delegable and their sense of what
constitutes performing as a responsible worker. If they feel it is inappro-
priate to delegate as much as their occupation requires, they assume the
mature course of action is to "choose" marginalization. For example,
Caren Camp decided to quit work when, calling home from a business
trip, she heard that her son just had taken his first step. "I realized that
his first year had gone by so quickly, I had been like a visitor in his
life."' 350 "I can always go back to work," Caren said. "I can't always
349 To my astonishment, some people read my Article Deconstructing Gender, supra note
187, to claim that no gender differences exist. These individuals make such claims despite the
fact that the Article says explicitly that I am denying the accuracy of Gilligan's description of
gender, not the existence of patterned differences between men and women. See Williams,
Deconstructing Gender, supra note 187, at 799, 801. Evidently the "if you believe men and
women are different, you must agree that the traditional descriptions of those differences are
accurate" syndrome is so strong even an explicit disclaimer cannot shake it.
350 Richardson, supra note 304, at C10.
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raise my child." 351 Marti Jacobs, age forty-one, expressed the same sen-
timent when she quit her job at the Department of Education after put-
ting herself through law school at night.352
Quiting is one solution. The alternative, of course, is to build a sys-
tem in which the ideal worker is not premised on norms of delegability
built around fatherhood as traditionally practiced. It is not inevitable
that adults who refuse to delegate most childrearing tasks to other adults
must be barred from accepted patterns of adult achievement. Women
should act to break the link between caregiving and marginalization. As
I talk to women who complain of missing their children's childhoods, my
sense is that most would not necessarily insist on being present twenty-
four hours every day. According to one national poll, seventy-one per-
cent of at-home mothers want to work.353 Presumably these women ob-
ject to the requirement that they work away from their homes for ten to
twelve hours a day or take part-time jobs that offer fewer rewards than
full-time work. Yet as our work lives are structured, jobs that require
less of a time commitment are marginalized. 354 Law firms have been
refreshingly explicit; some have formal policies that part-time work takes
associates off the partnership track.355 At a certain point, the discour-
aged worker syndrome that Vicki and Susan demonstrate emerges, and
the marginalized workers may retreat into domestic life.
To refer to the decision to drop out of the paid labor force as a
mother's "choice" diffuses demands for changes in the workaholic work
culture with its exploitation of "part-time" workers. By encouraging
women to think of work/family conflict as a matter of their own priori-
ties, the rhetoric discourages women from challenging a definition of
"ideal worker" that reinforces a system in which caregivers are "natu-
rally" marginalized-often to the ultimate detriment of children.
351 Id. at Cl.
352 Liz Spayd, More Women Trading Paychecks for Payoffs of Full-Time Parenting, Wash.
Post, July 8, 1991, at Al, A4 ("I only get one chance to watch Matthew grow up").
353 See Kantrowitz, supra note 199, at 47. The same poll showed that more than half of
women working part-time or in jobs with flexible schedules said they had cut back or changed
jobs to spend more time with their children.
354 See Chamallas, supra note 235, at 715-21. Note that the term "part-time" carries a
message of partiality and incompleteness that makes it an aspect of the problem rather than
the solution. Significantly, men of my acquaintance who do not conform to an ideal worker
pattern reject the "part-time" label, while women are more likely to accept it.
355 See Kingson, supra note 343, at A15. A 1989 survey of women lawyers found that 90
percent said they "believed that even if their firm offered part-time or flexible work schedules,
women who used those arrangements would be slowed or blocked in their quest for partner-
ship." Tamar Lewin, Women Say They Face Obstacles as Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1989,
at A21. For an attempt to redress the marginalization of part-time lawyers, see ABA Study,
supra note 208.
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c. Children's Needs. When the issue of delegation is not encoded
as a matter of a mother's personal priorities, it often is formulated as a
matter of children's needs. To examine this process of translation, let us
begin with the story of Carolyn Brown, a high-ranking manager for
American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T). 356 Ms. Brown worked
twelve-hour days, travelled a lot, and worried about the impact of her
pressured schedule on her children's lives, describing life for her children
in the following way:
They were in as big a rush as I was... I was up at 6:30! Eat
your breakfast! Grab your school bag! Slam! Bang! The
teacher asked me why Brentt rushed through his schoolwork.3 57
Her son, Brentt, was calling her at the office up to five times every day
"just to chat." Then, one day, she forgot to pick him up from school.
"Something in me said, 'These children need me.... I can't hire a re-
placement.' ,3s8 So she quit.
Ms. Brown, torn by an internalized work/family conflict, resolved
the conflict by conforming to the norms of selfless motherhood-she sac-
rificed her career so that her children's needs could be met. Like Carol
Gilligan's Ruth,359 she never considered challenging her employer's ex-
pectations or her husband's entitlement to perform as an ideal worker.
Formulating the issue as her "choice" to quit "because" of her "chil-
dren's needs" leaves out both the issue of whether her husband's work
life should remain immune and the issue of whether the workaholic cul-
ture of many elite jobs in this country is fair to children. This formula-
tion virtually guaranteed that the end result would be for her to quit: by
deciding not to challenge the structures within heterosexual marriage
and the workplace, no other path was open to ensure that her children's
needs were met.
Ms. Brown's story dramatizes the role of children in enforcing do-
mesticity. Brentt's phone calls to his mother's office sent a clear message:
her career should be subservient to his needs. The major role children
play in policing women back into domesticity is further demonstrated by
the following story.
One Tuesday, when Carol was teaching an evening class in
a business school... Daryl [her son] came into the kitchen and
the two [Daryl and his father Greg] went to watch TV. Once
"Mouseterpiece Theatre" was over and an absorbing documen-
356 Richardson, supra note 303, at Cl, CIO. Brown quit when her son was nine and her
daughter four.
357 Id. at C1O.
358 Id.
359 See text accompanying notes 52-63 supra.
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tary about an expeditionary team climbing Mount Everest had
caught Greg's attention, Daryl moved to imaginative play with a
car. He began to tell a long tale about a frog going "fribbit,
fribbit" in the car.... Greg was listening to "fribbit fribbit"
with half an ear. He tried to draw his son's attention to the
program with fatherly explanations about Yaks, and snow caves,
but no dice. Daryl brought out some cards and said, "Dad, let's
play cards." "I don't know how," Greg replied. "You can read
the directions," Daryl suggested. "No," Greg said. "Wait for
your mom. She knows how. 3 6°
Greg, like Brentt, received the message that if anyone would fulfill
his needs it would be his mother. In a society in which children's needs
often come last,3 61 children cannot be faulted for trying to see that some-
one takes care of them. Brentt's phone calls are significant not only for
highlighting how workaholic cultures are unfair to children, but also for
showing how fathers', mothers' and children's expectations align to en-
courage mothers to define the work/family conflict as an internal one to
be solved by career "sacrifice." Brentt's mother is vulnerable to the
message that her career should be subservient to his needs. In contrast,
all the parties involved assume his father's immunity.3 62
Greg's story serves a double purpose. Hochschild uses it to show
how fathers deflect their children's needs onto their wives; it also high-
lights the dynamic by which that process serves to reinforce its own legit-
imacy. Mothers tell stories like Greg's and conclude that fathers simply
lack the mothering instinct. My experience is different. Women learn to
mother, and so can men.3 63 When our first child was an infant, and I
invariably got up with her in the middle of the night, my husband liter-
ally did not hear her cries. When our second child came along, I, se-
verely overloaded, insisted that my husband bring the baby into our bed
so I could nurse him there. After a time, I literally did not hear our son's
cries, but my husband did. To the extent that mothers (as I did) help
their husbands train their children to look exclusively, or predominantly,
360 See A. Hochschild, supra note 201, at 149.
361 See R. Sidel, supra note 209.
362 If Brentt had called his father five times a day, I have little doubt but that his father
would have set him straight. More to the point, Brentt appears never to have called him. At
age eleven, Brentt had received the message that his father was entitled to immunity from his
needs, but his mother was not, even at the cost of interrupting her day at work and of inciting
her to quit a job she liked. See text accompanying note 397 infra. "What's the matter," asked
a six-year old whose mother was accompanying her and her eight-year old brother to the park.
"Why do you always bring a book? Aren't we enough?" See note 1 supra.
363 See Barbara J. Risman, Intimate Relationships from a Microstructural Perspective: Men
Who Mother, 1 Gender & Soc. 6, 25 ("parental role responsibility was as good a predictor of
self-reported feminine personality characteristics as biological sex").
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to their mothers to fulfill their needs, we are helping men and children
form gendered expectations that contribute to making our lives
unworkable.
4. How Choice Rhetoric Pits "Mommies Versus Mommies" 364
"How nice that you can walk little Bobby to school every morn-
ing," gushes a stay-at-home mother to a harried working mom
as she arrives at her son's school. "Otherwise, you'd never see
him." (Opening salvo.)
"Listen, Sophie really needs some fake fur for her princess cos-
tume," wheedles a working mom talking to her next-door neigh-
bor. "Since you're home with so much time, would you mind
picking some up at the store for me?" (Direct hit.)
"Oh, you're a lawyer. How exciting. It must be so much fun to
get dressed up and go to an office all day. And I'm sure that
Joey does just fine at the day-care center." (Heavy artillery.)365
The war of "mommy versus mommy" came to recent attention with
Hillary Clinton's "cookies and teas" remark, which alienated many
homemakers.366 Nina Darnton documented the sniping between em-
ployed women and women who do not work outside the home, a battle
which stems, in part, from the vulnerabilities of both groups.367 Em-
ployed women, most of them raised by mothers at home, worry that they
are cheating their kids; stay-at-home mothers feel they are missing out of
the status and recognition wage labor brings. Both groups, in other
words, feel the sting of gender disadvantage, but instead of focusing their
dissatisfaction on a system that pits their aspirations against their chil-
dren's needs, they criticize each other.
Stay-at-home mothers send the message loud and clear that working
mothers fail to meet their children's needs. A Minneapolis video pro-
ducer reported to Darnton that a disapproving at-home mother counted
up the number of times she went to her son's soccer practice and "made
sure she let me know she couldn't imagine not being there when her
child came home from school. ' 368 At-home mothers also expressed re-
sentment over having to give out their phone numbers for emergencies
and to accept everyone else's packages. 369 Women who do not question
their husbands' right to domestic services become resentful when other
women ask them to provide such services. "For the latchkey kids who
364 See Nina Darnton, Mommy v. Mommy, Newsweek, June 4, 1990, at 64.
365 Id.
366 See text accompanying note 271 supra.
367 See Darnton, supra note 364.
368 Id. at 65.
369 Id.
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are all over this neighborhood, where do they come when they're lonely
or scared?" one at-home mother asked. "To us." T3 70
The war of mommies-versus-mommies is not limited to a conflict
between employed and nonemployed mothers. For contemporary Amer-
ican women are not divided into two dichotomous groups; instead, they
are on a continuum. Some are as work-primary as "high-powered" men
in elite corporate jobs; others have little work-identification and no career
or job commitment. But most American women lie somewhere in be-
tween. 371 The infinite gradations of work commitments are divisive, as
each woman judges women more work-primary than herself as "self-cen-
tered" and those less work-primary as having "copped out."
But the very differences that now divide women could help bind
them together, as each of us recognizes that we all are on the same con-
tinuum and that no one point on that continuum holds "the" answer,
because every point requires mothers to make trade-offs few fathers face.
This recognition is important to foster mutual respect and to counteract
the tendency among some feminists and career women to assume that life
is lived to the fullest by a very work-centered existence. Feminists should
be able to join others in critiquing the excessive work-centeredness of
contemporary professional work cultures while continuing to insist on
equal access for men and women to the accepted avenues of adult
achievement. 372 This approach holds promise to unite women against
the marginalization that traditionally has accompanied their care-giving
responsibilities. It also holds promise for men, by promising to deliver
them from the excessively work-primary existence that often has de-
prived them of key aspects of the job of parenting. Again, the core argu-
ment is that caregiving should be respected as an integral part of the
adult lives of both men and women, and that nurturing should not pre-
clude access to the accepted avenues of adult advancement.
In the gender war among women in the work/family context, an
important theme emerges that we first examined in the abortion context:
the linkage between mothers' "choice" of domesticity and domesticity's
critique of self-interest in favor of nurturance. Darnton notes that at-
home mothers often think of career-and-family mothers as selfish yuppies
who never believe they have enough money.3 73 These mothers sound like
Ginsburg's right-to-life activists374 because they are the same group of
370 Id. at 66.
371 For documentation that many American women shift to different points along the con-
tinuum at different points in their lives, see Schultz, supra note 245, at 1815-43.
372 For an example of a feminist critique of professional work cultures, see the work of
Constance Perin, supra note 348.
373 Darnton, supra note 364, at 66.
374 See F. Ginsburg, supra note 80, at 186-93.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
December 19911
HeinOnline -- 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1625 1991
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
people: Ginsburg's right-to-life activists tended to be women whose ma-
jor self-defining adult decision was to drop out of the work force after the
birth of a child.375 These mothers often see their lives as articulating the
internal critique of "that bank note world" that always has been an inte-
gral part of domesticity. At-home mothers (whether right-to-life advo-
cates or not) sometimes translate their choice of "children over success"
into an argument that women who insist on pursuing the accepted paths
of adult achievement are obsessed with money, out of touch with the
needs of their children, and out of touch with humane, nurturing, non-
competitive values in general.376 At best, at-home mothers realize hu-
mane and nurturing values in their own lives both within their
households and within the larger community. Take the example of a
forceful and intelligent woman of my acquaintance who cares for her
three children and plays a prominent role in the La Leche League, which
offers badly needed support to nursing mothers. It's ironic, her husband
said one day, she's "home with the kids" but she was out three evenings
last week. It didn't strike me as ironic at all. Like generations of women
before her,377 she had restructured her work life not only to accommo-
date her children's needs, but to express her ideals of nurture in the
larger community.
The point is not that domesticity's critique is hollow, but that it
leaves most of its adherents in less enviable positions. As noted above,
power within the household often correlates with the amount of money
each spouse earns. The power of money works in a thousand small
ways. 378 "I told her she could stay home, but that then there was no way
I was getting up with the baby in the middle of the night." For the
mother who also has older children who do not nap, this means consign-
ment to permanent exhaustion-and some shaky mothering as a
result.
3 7 9
The official ideology of at-home mothering is silent on these issues.
In Ginsburg's and Luker's books, this ideology emerges in snippets. A
more systematic defense was published by William R. Mattox of the
Family Research Council. 380 Mattox argues that "traditional" families
sacrifice income to ensure their children a parent's care: the median in-
come for two-earner families is $45,266; for single-earner married
couples it is $28,747. He notes "the guilt that some Yuppie couples feel
375 Id. at 140.
376 Compare the experience of Ruth. See text accompanying notes 56-60 supra.
377 For a review of the literature on the history of women "volunteer" reformers, see F.
Ginsburg, supra note 80, at 227-47.
378 See text accompanying notes 50-52, 129-35, 337-42 supra.
379 This is my surmise, based on experience with exhausted motherhood.
380 William R. Mattox, Jr., The Mothers of All Myths, Wash. Post, Aug. 3, 1991, at A19.
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for putting careers ahead of children. 381
Mattox is very open in adopting the societal strategy of using chil-
dren's needs to blackmail women out of their aspirations to the standard
paths of adult achievement. This strategy combines the message that
children will suffer unless one parent quits working full-time with the
ideology of gender equality. Mattox links these two elements in several
ways. One method is familiar: using the language of gender equality, he
implies that the issue is whether one parent will quit, whereas his real
message is that mothers should quit. A second mechanism achieves the
same result: by framing the issue as one offamily sacrifice, he need not
mention that the family member who retains and develops his full value
as a wage earner is the husband. The wife's disadvantage-in the divorce
courts, in her reduced power within the household, in terms of her block-
age from the standard avenues of adult self-development-all recede con-
veniently into the background. The issue becomes whether one wants
secure, well-cared-for children on $28,000 a year or poor little rich kids.
This formula again demonstrates the ineffectuality of domesticity's inter-
nal critique of capitalism and wage labor, which condemns materialism
and self-interest only when the employment or self-development of
women is at issue.
Mothers' inability-or their refusal-to be a sole-source supplier for
their children's needs does not involve ignoring those needs. Bringing
fathers and other adults into the daily work of childrearing promises ben-
efits for everyone. Adults can achieve more balanced lives, oriented to-
wards other people and the future of the community rather than solely
towards a career. Children receive the attention of at least two commit-
ted adults with different strengths and weaknesses as "primary" caretak-
ers.3 82 It is the rare couple who does not think that the father quite
simply handles some situations better-the child should benefit from the
strengths of both parents.38 3
Children benefit not only from the increased involvement of fathers,
but also from quality child-care-not, of course, for twelve hours a day,
381 Id.
382 Active involvement of the father and other adults is particularly important when a per-
sonality conflict exists between mother and child, as when a very "active" mother has a very
"quiet" child. See T. Berry Brazelton, Mothers and Children 17-22, 55-69, 86-95, 112-16, 162-
66, 222-24, 255, 270-71, 274 (1983) (story of personality clash between mother and her "quiet"
baby, with consequent tension between mother and child and closer bonding of baby to father).
Brazelton's dramatic example shows the price some children pay for the one-sided allocation
of responsibilities to their mothers.
383 Researchers almost universally view more parenting by fathers as beneficial for parents
as well as children. See Nancy Chodorow, Gender, Relation, and Difference in Psychoanalytic
Perspective, in The Future of Difference 15-16 (Hester Eisenstein & Alice Jardine eds. 1980);
Michael E. Lamb et al., Summary and Recommendations for Public Policy, in Fatherhood
and Family Policy 247 (Michael E. Lamb & Abraham Sagi eds. 1983).
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but for part of their waking hours. The contemporary American convic-
tion that children are best raised by one isolated woman is mystifying.
Even in western society, the family did not conform until very recently to
this pattern. Before the Industrial Revolution, mothers had a key eco-
nomic role. Their child-care tasks had to fit in around their household
production, or everyone literally would starve in the dark.3 84 Moreover,
fathers took a large part in childrearing.385 Childrearing literature of-
fered its advice largely to fathers or ungenderedparents:386 the assump-
tion of mother as sole-source supplier came later.387 Moreover, much of
the actual minute-to-minute child care was performed by older siblings
(usually sisters) or servant "girls. ' 388 The notion that children will
wither without the full-time attention of a mother whose adult role is
defined as child-care is not "traditional" in the sense of reflecting timeless
biological or psychological necessity.
An anti-essentialist analysis suggests room for some increased per-
spective on "children's needs." While white upper-middle-class families
(like Ms. Brown's) tend to think of mother's employment as diverting
attention from children's needs, among African-American and working-
class families the assumption often differs. They, too, assume that work
for mothers must be justified as meeting children's needs, but they more
often assume it meets this test: one blue-collar mother asked, "what
could I do for my kids and husband just sitting around all day?" 389 She
saw her work as increasing opportunities for her children to enable them
to achieve a "better life" than that of their parents. A child in such a
family presumably would not feel the entitlement Brentt felt to his
mother's work time. Children's sense of entitlement also may differ in
the African-American community where mothers traditionally have not
been able-or expected-to stop working outside the home.390 Finally, a
subtler message is that, as in the abortion context, the ideology of female
self-sacrifice produces not a single set of women's "choices," but consis-
tent patterns of justification-whatever women do they do for the good
of their children.
384 See N. Cott, supra note 25, at 40-41..
385 Ruth N. Bloch, Untangling the Roots of Modem Sex Roles: A Survey of Four Centuries
of Change, 4 Signs: J. Women in Culture and Soc'y 237, 241 (1978).
386 Id. at 242.
387 Id. at 243; Bloch, supra note 32, at 113.
388 Cf. Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, Good Wives 157 (1983) (indicating that children also
worked as servants in own and other households); John Demos, A Little Commonwealth 64-
70 (1970) (describing colonial households as including servants).
389 See Schultz, supra note 245, at 1820 (quoting Mary Lindenstein Wedshok, Blue-Collar
Women: Pioneers on the Male Frontier 252 (1981); see also E. Rosen, supra note 248, at 110.
390 See Jacqueline Jones, Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow 63-64, 184-90, 228, 268-70 (1985)
(documenting African-American women's history of combining motherhood with wage
labor).
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Yet, when children are taught a sense of entitlement that their
mother's adult life will be subservient to her duty to be a sole-source
supplier for their needs, their subsequent demands provide a very power-
ful force in policing women back into traditional gender roles. Children
clearly should not be charged with the mandate of challenging the con-
straints within which their parents' choices are framed. But women
should. Note the difference between this assertion and a false conscious-
ness argument. I am not arguing that others are blind to the constraints
that frame their choices, while I see those constraints with supercilious
clarity. Instead, I am as much a product of the ideology of domesticity
as any mother. Consequently I have formulated my entreaty to women
not (solely) to protect their claims to self-development, but by arguing
that challenging the marginalization of caregivers will meet children's
needs better than will following the traditional mandate to selflessness. I
do this in part to convince others, and in part to convince myself, in an
attempt to diffuse the tension felt between femininity and adulthood.3 91
5. How "Choice" Rhetoric Pits the Ideology of Gender Equality
Against Women
The analysis thus far has stressed the arrangements by which society
requires selflessness from mothers in order to provide for children's needs
without interfering with other adults' pursuit of self-interest in the repub-
lic of choice. This section examines the forces that make women resist
formulating their sacrifices as sacrifices and that encourage them to en-
code those sacrifices as their own free choice.
Stories of women who bonded with careers and then gave them up
because of the work/family conflict speak forcefully to their sense of sac-
rifice and loss. "We've been married all this time, and you still don't get
it," said one of Hochschild's subjects when her husband suggested that
she work part-time.3 92 "Work is important to me. I worked hard to get
my [advanced degree.] Why should I give it up?" 39 3 Even media stories
celebrating the "choices" of women who quit acknowledge the pain in-
volved. The article highlighting Carmen Camp and Carolyn Brown pro-
vides a vivid example.394 Both women described their pain at leaving
their careers: "Quitting was the most difficult decision of my life," said
Ms. Camp,395 who so dreaded having to identify herself as a homemaker
that she avoided filling out forms for several months. "It was like turn-
ing a light switch off in the only room I had known," said Ms. Brown,
391 See text accompanying notes 45, 55 supra.
392 See A. Hochschild, supra note 201, at 41 (emphasis in original).
393 Id. (emphasis in original).
394 See Richardson, supra note 303, at Cl, C10.
395 Id. at Cl.
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the woman who had worked with AT&T for sixteen years. 396
Given this level of pain, why are these women's decisions character-
ized as "choice" and not as sacrifice? This phenomenon is a relatively
recent one. In the Victorian era, men and women alike agreed that self-
lessness was the mark of an admirable woman. 397 Today, of course, the
ideology of separate spheres for men and women no longer is part of the
self-image of mainstream America. One of the key accomplishments of
the second wave of feminism was the idea of gender equality.
Yet Hochschild suggests the idea of gender equality has not been
wholly beneficial in the context of the work/family conflict. She high-
lights its role in encoding sacrifice as choice in her discussion of Evan
and Nancy Holt.398 Nancy had a strong belief in gender equality but a
husband who emphatically resisted doing domestic work. Nancy eventu-
ally realized that her marriage would break up if she persisted in her
demands that her husband share the second shift. So she agreed to work
part-time, with a sense of resentment and regret; her feelings largely un-
acknowledged in the "family myth" that she and Evan shared equally in
domestic tasks because he took care of the garage and the dog, while she
took care of the house and their son.
Nancy might well have described her solution as her choice to go
part- rather than full-time. Her only alternative, given that she had de-
cided to preserve her marriage, was to admit she had made a sacrifice her
husband had not made: she had sidelined a career that both she and her
husband agreed was more important to her than his career was to him.399
To a Victorian woman, this acknowledgement of self-sacrifice would
have sounded like a compliment. Given Nancy's belief in gender equal-
ity, it would sound like an insult.
Nancy's example offers substantial insight into the mechanism by
which the female norm of "selfless sacrifice" has been transformed into
the rhetoric of "choice." Because women live in the "republic of
choice," where normal adults pursue the free development and unfolding
of their personality, they tend to describe their sacrifices as the result of
free choice. To admit sacrifice-as did Pat Nixon, who said that she had
"sacrificed everything in [her] life that [she] considered precious in order
to advance [her] husband's political career"-conveys the image not of a
moral exemplar but of a loser.4 °
396 Id.
397 See Ann Douglas, The Feminization of American Culture 44 (1977) (a woman should be
"above all .. unselfish").
398 See A. Hochschild, supra note 201, at 33-58.
399 Id. at 41-42, 55-58.
4W See, e.g., Dan Balz, Careers, Families Obscure the Lure of Campaign Trail, Wash. Post,
July 7, 1991, at A1, A6 (discussing public statements of wives of political candidates about
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The tendency in our "republic of choice" is to make discussion of
the constraints within which choices occur reduce the actors to pathetic
victims or to depict them as mere victims of false consciousness, mind-
lessly playing out prescribed roles. Shortcircuiting the link between dis-
cussion of constraints and insult to those subjected to them is a task for
intellectuals, not for overburdened women coping with everyday exist-
ence. Women abruptly estranged from a central portion of their identity,
as when they quit careers that have defined them almost as thoroughly as
Seth's defined him,4'w do not need further dislocation. Their claim of
free agency is part of their path to self-respect.
The irony, as the Holt family myth so vividly depicts, is that the
ideal of gender equality often is preserved not by changing the distribu-
tion of power between men and women, but by denying the existence of
gender inequality. Couples decide it is "only rational" for the wives, not
the husbands, to quit. Very often, couples can point to the fact that hus-
bands earn more (itself often a product of gender inequality).4°2 But even
without this convenient mechanism for turning gender discrimination
outside the house into a mechanism for reenforcing men's gender privi-
lege inside it, couples tend to assume that the husband, not the wife, will
maintain ideal worker status.4 °3
Is it plausible that somehow, with sparse, isolated exceptions, the
unfettered choice of ungendered adults results in fathers maintaining
their privileged access to the full, simultaneous flowering of their person-
alities in work and family life, while their wives invariably make sponta-
neous, ungendered choices in order to enable them to do so? It is not.
Yet to deny that mothers magically "choose" to subsume their careers,
to claim that these results stem from a systematic gender privilege-cer-
tainly to argue to the wife of a workaholic professional that her hus-
band's career is built upon a flow of domestic services-is to affront the
integrity of her husband and their love, and her self-image as a self-re-
specting actor pursuing her own self-development in the republic of
choice.
This is how the ideology of gender equality works against women in
the context of the work/family conflict. The claim that a power differen-
tial exists within the household often serves not to mobilize women to
extent to which they are expected to subsume their lives to their husbands' candidacies and to
play role of uncritical, ever-supporting wife).
401 See text accompanying notes 395-96 supra.
402 Female full-time, year-round workers make 71.1% of the annual median earnings of
men. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Census Bureau, Current Pop. Rep., Consumer Income
Series, P-60, No. 174, at 106-07 (rable 24).
403 See, e.g., The Diane Rehm Show (WAMU radio broadcast, Aug. 1, 1991) (interviewing
tax lawyer who left significant salary as partner in D.C. firm although her husband was with-
out a job).
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confiscate the gender advantage, 4°4 but to translate the conflict into a
fight among women.
My sense is that young professional women are most receptive to the
analysis that husbands' careers are supported by a flow of domestic serv-
ices while wives are not. "What gets me," said a first-year law student in
my Property class, with obvious pain, "is that I'm going through all this,
I'm going to law school to avoid dependency, and once I have children
I'm still going to end up dependent." Older women who already have
made the "choice" to subsume their careers are more receptive to the
notion that people who work part-time should not be punished for doing
so. This leaves their husbands out of it and focuses blame outside the
household. One woman found after four years of sporadic, part-time
work that her children's nursery school wanted her husband, not herself,
on the board. Formerly satisfied with her "choice," she began to protest
that committed parents should not be punished for meeting their chil-
dren's needs.
We need both rhetorics because they will appeal to women in differ-
ent life situations. The language of husbands parasitic on flows of domes-
tic services from their wives is useful in divorce courts and to encourage
younger women to begin early to negotiate with their companions over
work and family issues. Once women in existing heterosexual marriages
have made the "choice" to privilege their husband's careers, this rhetoric
often becomes unappealing so long as they remain married. Yet they can
relate to the notion that they should not be punished outside the home
for meeting their children's needs within it. Together these two rhetorics
hold considerable promise to help women externalize the work/family
conflict that now pits them against one another.
In conclusion, Part III argues that feminists must translate the gen-
der war within and among women into a sustained challenge to the struc-
tures outside of women. Through narratives, it looks past the rhetoric of
choice to the pervasive power differential between men and women with
respect to simultaneous self-development inside the household and
outside it. The context of "working mothers" is an appropriate place to
challenge the covert premise of selfless motherhood embedded in the re-
public of choice because, unlike in the abortion context, women's refusal
to be blackmailed out of their ambitions can be framed as an expression
of their commitment to children and their entitlement to equality with
men, rather than as a selfish decision to throw children to the wind.
404 This phrase is from Judy Roseman, Confiscate the Gender Advantage, L.A. Times, Apr.
1, 1989, at 8.
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CONCLUSION:
THE RADICAL FUTURE OF LIBERAL FEMINISM
If all of the mommies and daddies could play by the same rules,
what a difference that would make. Now the rules are unfair.
Those willing to abandon children and spouse get a different
track .... [Those who don't] pay in the coin of money and
status and advances. 405
This Article attempts to reframe the basic imagery of family life. It
questions the traditional image of a housewife supported by her husband,
showing instead how the traditional husband is supported by a flow of
domestic services from his wife. Shifting this basic paradigm is a way to
address the systematic economic disadvantage marriage imposes upon
mothers.406 Once women are freed from the ideology of choice, they can
band together to imagine new worlds in which individual women do not
feel trapped, in which children's needs are not pitted against adults' plans
for self-development, but rather are viewed as central to our mission as a
society.4°7
Underlying this approach is the premise that the term "choice" does
not merely identify some preexisting inner psychological state, but rather
states a conclusion about social responsibility. Choice rhetoric entails a
strategic decision to focus attention on a realm of "free" choice rather
than on the constraints within which those choices occur. Choice rheto-
ric is not appropriate where patterns of individual behavior follow largely
unacknowledged gender norms that operate to disempower women.
This attitude towards rhetoric reflects the belief that language does
not merely reflect preexisting truths, but rather encapsulates particular,
situated perspectives, each of which brings some elements of the visual
field into sharp focus at the expense of blurring others. Often the selec-
tion of rhetoric is unconscious; I have explored the reasons why feminists
should be more conscious of their use of rhetoric in the context of abor-
tion and work/family conflict. If, as I have argued, the liberal language
of autonomy has a tendency to divide women, feminists may need to
405 Donna Schaper & Warren Goldstein, Consequences of the "Daddy Track," Christian
Sci. Monitor, June 16, 1989, at 18.
406 See text accompanying notes 217-20, 252-58 supra.
407 As able scholars have noted, the role of litigation in this transformation will be severely
limited by the fact that Title VII in effect offers equality only for women who conform to the
male model of ideal worker with no child-care responsibilities. See Abrams, supra note 203, at
1226-33; Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 824-25
(1990); Dowd, Gender Paradox, supra note 203, at 81, 135-71, and sources therein; Mary Ann
Mason, Motherhood v. Equal Treatment, 29 J. Fam. Law 1, 31 (1990-91). For an innovative
argument that employers should be held liable under Title VII because they contribute to the
formation of worker's preferences, see Schultz, supra note 245, at 1815-43.
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increase their sense of the strategic in the context of other issues as well.
Because of the predominance of the liberal language within the law, this
is a particularly pressing problem for feminist jurisprudence.
Also pressing is the central problem underlying both the abortion
debate and the continuing controversies over "working mothers." We
are involved in a national showdown over parenting, and the male voice
is winning out.4°8 This is expressed in the common assumption that
child care is the solution to work/family conflict. Child care must play a
vital role, but it is not the full solution. Rather, the solution lies in our
ability to pretend-just for a moment-that a responsible parent, male or
female, is one whose work life enables him or her to meet nondelegable
children's needs without demanding that the child's other parent carry a
disproportionate burden of the child's parenting, at the cost of his or her
access to the conventional paths to societal recognition, accomplishment,
and self-development.
This recognition truly would be a gender revolution, for it would
require men to structure their identities less in terms of work and women
to disaggregate the "traditional" mothering role into its various compo-
nents. These facets include daily care as well as emotional work, the
maintenance of social relationships, volunteer work designed to benefit
the children at school-the list is long and complex. Rethinking mother-
hood will require us not only to rethink who we are as women, but also
to challenge the gendered structure of wage labor. Such a project would
mobilize the "danger" in the dangerous supplement of domesticity, since
the only way to eliminate the need for selflessness from mothers is to
change the definition of self-interest for others, so that self-interest
(should we keep the word) includes much more attention to affiliative
and communal needs than the traditional liberal model suggests.
This, as Zillah Eisenstein said long ago, is the radical future of lib-
eral feminism.40 9 The beauty of using the work/family conflict as a deep
challenge to self-interest is that it allows women to launch the challenge
by championing the needs of children. It offers the opportunity to turn
what is valuable about domesticity-its critique of self-interest-against
its destructive insistence of the selflessness of women.
408 By the male voice I mean norms framed around traditionally male life patterns.
409 See Zillah R. Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism 201-48 (1981).
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